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I. INTRODUCTION
There exist people and whole societies of people that are not technologically
oriented or inclined. Usually, these peoples' lives and functioning patterns are ruled by
their deep roots and attachment to their highly traditional· and cultural values.
Furthermore, these" people have a tendency not to readily accept or: adopt solutions
that are offered by technological innovations and their agents; They. have this
tendency even though they are exposed to and aware of the numerous successful
solutions that other, technically oriented people and societies have found in their
pursuit of controlling consumption of scarce natural resources, of restoring and
preserving the endangered planet's environment, of improving mankind's living
standards, and generally in advancing science and improving whatever the scientific
research can produce. The latter ill-vest in. research1 and find solutions by using new
and highly technical methods of problem solving. The former are· characterized by
some kind of inconvenience when it comes to trusting and adopting such technological
methods and solutions. We think that the biggest problem between these two groups of
people· is the fact that they cannot communiCate properly either because they do not
understand each.; other or because they do·not know how to deal with one another, or
both.
This naturally applies to the respective military societies as well since they are a
natural part of their societies and they are characterized by the same cultural norms
and ways of living, thinking and general functioning.
In this thesis,we will adopt the relatively new division of the military into two
broad categories: the "institutional" military and the "occupational" military [Ref; 1].
Institutional refers to· the military that is grounded in its own special values and norms.
Its members are not motivated by self-interest but, rather, by service to a higher goal:
duty, honour, country. It is the institutional military who do not readily implement
technology. The occupational military is usually motivated by self-interest, not only by
the call of duty. They are the ones who pursue technological answers to problems.
. IThis is what research does; it smooths out contradiction, makes things simpler,
logIcal and coherent.
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The Greek military is recognized as belonging to the typically institutional
military. The Hellenic Navy, though, after a long period of preparation, has adopted
computers in fields like inventory control and payroll, mainly due to the complexity of
modem operations. However, it is, in the whole, very reluctant to extensively adopt
the computer, not only as a decision aid, but generally in anything outside the above
mentioned fields, unless the technological innovation is correctly introduced. On the
other hand;. it is highly likely that theywilrsoon have to> consider computer aid in
many other fields because modern naval warfare; military operations and weapons are
reaching new heights of complexity every day. Therefore, decision-making in the Navy
will have to become faster, more effective and more rational than ever before. This is a
field in which the Greek military leader should consider the use of computers very
soon. But given he is of the institutional military, he will not readily allow the
computer to take an active part in his decision making activities and procedures,
because this is a field where personal and organizational· experience and intuition are
the main and traditional factors.
The goal of this thesis is to try to influence the institutional military leader's
attitude toward the usefulness of the computer, especially its use in decision-making
processes. In Chapter II we investigate and expose to him the real reasons for which
we believe he is not prepared to readily accept and adopt high technology solutions to
his problems, especially his decision making problems. vVe claim that the reasons are
hidden behind his culture and stable norms.
Then we will try to model an indicated method of approach, one that "vill
possibly succeed in changing his attitude towards accepting and adopting technological
innovations. This is done in Chapter III by some in depth analysis of the diffusion of
technological innovations.
Chapter IV contains some essential pieces of information about current
technology and computers which we feel that an institutional military should know, if
he is interested in surviving the "computer revolution", which we think that he is
neither totally aware. of, nor properly prepared for.
After a review of modeling concepts and of the decision making process, in
Chapter V we present the capabilities, limitations and the current status of the
computer in assisting decision making. Then we propose an indicated procedure, that
may, according to our expectations and based on our arguments, contribute in
changing the Greek naval decision maker's attitude toward computer-assisted decision
making.
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Finally, in Chapter VI we develop two different kinds of programs in order to
find fast and rational solutions to some typical naval decision making problems, using
the computer. We use two powerful techniques that find application in Operations
Research, namely computer simulation and linear/non-linear optimization. The listings
of the developed programs are given in the appendices.
Hopefully, the transfer of knowledge about himself, about the others and about
the computer that will be attempted in this thesis, together "'ith a modest
"demonstration~' of the ability of the computer in assisting decision making, will be
persuasive and will help the institutional military, specifically the Hellenic Navy; to
develop a basis on which to at least consider the possibility of including the computer in
existing and future decision making situations. This would be for us a reasonable and
justified achievement.
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II. THE INSTITUTIONAL MILITARY
A. BACKGROUND
There are two related crises in today's world. The first and most visible is the
population/environmentaL crisis. The second,. more subtle but equally lethal, is
humankind's relationships to its extentions; institutions, ideas; technology and
progress, as well as the relationships among the many individuals and groups that
inhabit the globe; The- most important and fundamental difference between these
various groups is the difference in culture.
If both crises are not resolved, neither will be. Despite our faith in technology
and our reliance on technolol!ical solutions, there are no technical solutions to most of
the problems confronting human beings. Furthermore; even those technical solutions
that can be applied to environmentalproblems cannot be.~applied rationallyand.with
determination, until mankind transcends the intellectuaL liInitations, imposed. by our
institutions, our philosophies, our religions and our cultures. Compounding all of this
is the reality of politics.
Politics is a major part of life -beginning in the home and becoIning more and
more'visible as power is manifest in the larger institutions on' the local,. national and
international levels; But apart from power and.:politics, culture.stillplays a proIninent
visible role in the relations between the East and the vVest, for example; Culture has
always been an issue, not only between Europe and Russia, but among the European
states as well. The Germans, the French, the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese,the
Greeks and. the British as well as the Scandinavians and the Balkan. cultures; all have
their own identity, language, systems of nonverbal communication, material culture,
history and ways ofdoing things [Ref. 2: p. 1].
At the moment, Europe is prosperous, temporarily calm and causing few
problems. But what about the clash of cultures in the Middle East, the Far East, the
multiple African and Latin American cultures, that are all demanding to be recognized
in their own right? Any Westerner who was raised outside these cultures and claims he
really understands and can communicate with any of them is deluding himself. In all
these crises, the future depends on man's ability to transcend the liInits of individual
cultures. To do so, however, he must first recognize and accept the multiple hidden
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dimensions of unconscious culture; because every culture has its own hidden, unique
form of unconscious culture [Ref. 2: p. 2].
Technology is not likely to directly assist in this direction because these are
human problems. Hardin argues [Ref. 3] that single-track, Newtonian (Apollonian)
approach will satisfy only the politicians and the big exploiters who stand to gain from
oversimplification of issues. What is needed is a more comprehensive, Darwinian·
(Dionysian) approach [Ref. 4: p. 188] that can be used as a basis; for establishing
priorities,. alternatives and options} In other words, unless·· human beings and human
decision makers can learn to pull together,. control the resources and regulate
consumption and production patterns, they are headed for disaster. It is impossible to
cooperate or to do any of these things unless we understand or know each other's ways
of thinking.
Mankind is then in need of the best possible decisions and. solutions. This is a
great responsibility and we would. like to believe that the' top decision' makers,. no
matter to what society they belong,; are aware of their responsibilities as,much as ohhe
difficulty of really understanding each, others' way of thinking~
A good part , though, of the'decision makers are military and today, as in' the
past,. military forces are major users of current technology.. Understandably, this
improves .. their effectiveness, and. helps them imaccomplishing' their specific objectives.
The question, however, is whether they could: use technology to assist or even improve·
their part of decision-making,
The point is that while maintaining a. degree of autonomy, any military force
necessarily reflects the society and the culture of which it is a part~ Therefore, since this
thesis is focused on the military decision making, we should try first of alL to
understand the military and their. societies.
B. CULTURE AND THE MILITARY
1. Facts about Culture and Context
In order to be able to understand better the military societies and their
idiosyncrasies, we must look into the cultures they are part of, because everything
depends and is deeply rooted in each culture and its extentions.
2According to the old Greek system, there are two types (systems) of evolution
and t?rogr~ss; t~e Apoll.oni~n, "whicli tends to devel9p estab1ished lines to perfection",
and the DIOnYSIan, WhICh IS more apt to open new hnes of research .
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Culture is man's medium and all aspects of human life are touched and altered
by culture. This means personality, how people express themselves (including shows of
emotions), the way they think, how they move, how problems are solved, how their
cities are planned and laid out, how transportation systems are organized and function,
as well as how economic, government and military systems are put together and
function.
Nevertheless, and in spite of many differences in detail,. anthropologists agree
on three characteristics of culture; it is not innate, but learned; the various facets of
culture are interrelated -you touch a culture in one place and everything else is affected;
it is shared and in effect defines the boundaries of different groups.
One of the functions of culture (and in fact a major structural feature of the
unconscious culture) is to provide a highly selective screen or filter between man and
the outside world. In its many forms, culture therefore designates what we pay
attention to and what we ignore;. This screening function provides structure for the
world and protects the nervous system from "information overload".3 The degree to
which one is aware of the selective screen that one places between himself and the outside
world can. be measured on the "context" scale. The degree of"context" or the position
that a culture holds on the context scale is one of the major characteristics of culture
and it can be used for general culture's classification purposes. That is, one can
classify cultures as being near the low-context (LC), the middle, or the high-context
(HC) end of such a continuum [Ref; 2: p. 86]. Under this notion, we can define people
as being low-context (LC) and high-context (HC). As one moves from the low to the
high side of the scale, awareness of the selective process increases. Therefore, what we
pay attention to, context, and information overload are all functionally closely related.
But who uses more and who uses less of this selective "filtering" and when?
2. Context, Timing and Stability
The solution to the problem of coping with increased complexity and greater
demands on the system seems to lie in the preprogramming of the individual or the
organization. This is done by means of the"contexting" process and it all depends on
how people use time and space.
3Information overload is a technical term applied to information-processing
systems. It describes a situation in which the system breaks down when it cannot
properly handle the huge volume of information to which it is subjected.
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According to Hall [Ref. 2: p. 17] people, their societies and cultures can be
characterized as "monochronic" (M-time) and "polychronic" (P-time). Monochronic
time and polychronic time represent two variant solutions to the use of both time and
space as organizing frames for all activities. Space is included because the two systems
(time and space) are functionally interrelated. M-time emphasizes schedules,
segmentation and promptness. P-time systems are characterized by several things
happening at once. They stress involvement of people and completion of transactions
rather than adherence to preset schedules. P-time is treated as much less tangible than
lVI-time. Polychronic time, as the term implies, is nonlinear, while monochronic time is
linear.4 It is in this respect that cultures very often contrast with each other. M-time
people overseas are psychologically stressed in many ways when confronted by P-time
systems such as those in Latin America and the Middle East. In markets and stores of
Mediterranean countries, one is surrounded by other customers vying for the attention
of a clerk. There is no order whatsoever as to who is served next and to the northern
European or American, confusion and clamor abound. In a different context, the same
patterns apply 'within the governmental bureaucracies of the Mediterranean countries:
a cabinet officer, for instance, may have a large reception area outside his private
office. There are almost always small groups waiting in this area and these groups are
visited by government officials, who move around the room conferring with each;
Much of their business is transacted in public instead of having a series of private
meetings in an inner office. Particularly distressing to Americans is the way in which
appointments are handled by polychronic people. Appointments just don't carry the
same weight as they do in the United States. Things are constantly shifted around.
Nothing seems to be solid or firm, particularly plans for the future, and there are
always changes in the most important plans right up to the very last minute.
In contrast, within the 'Western world, man finds little in life that is exempt
from the iron hand of lVI-time. In fact, his social and business life, even his sex life, are
apt to be completely time-dominated. Time is so thoroughly woven into his existence
that we are hardly aware of the degree to which it determines and co-ordinates
everything we do, including the molding of relations with others in many subtle ways.
By scheduling we compartmentalize; this makes it possible to concentrate on one thing
4There are many different and legitimate ways of thinking; people in the West
value one of these ways above all others --the one we call "logic, a linear system that
has been with us since Socrates. In contrast, a P-time person can be said to be




at a time, but at the same time it denies us context. M-time people speak of time as
being saved, spent, wasted, lost, made up, accelerated, slowed down, crawling or
running out. These metaphors should be taken very seriously, because they express the
basic manner in which time is conceived as an unconscious determinant or frame on
which everything else is built. M-time scheduling is used as a classification system that
orders the fast; busy, high-tech life of the vVestem civilization. Without M-time
scheduling and systems,. it is very doubtful if our industriaL civilization could ever have
developed as it has:. Furthermore, the great use of computers in the M-time societies
has an interesting role,. because the more you work and depend on computers the more
you need to respect and obey tight time-keeping rules and scheduling; the computer
does not waste time and demands strict programming. The reverse also holds: the more
you exercise scheduling, the more you need to work and depend on computers. It is a
closed and increasing loop that characterizes the fast-paced~ time-conscious societies,
like the monochronic;. butthe' same do not apply to thepolychronicones.
Scheduling is difficult ifnot impossible with P-time people unless they have
mastered M-time technically as a very different system, one they do not confuse with.
their own but only when it is situationally appropriate, much as they use a foreign
language..
Theoretically,. when considering sociaL or military organizations, P-time
systems should demand a much greater centralization of control and be characterized
by a rather shallow or simple structure. This is because the top manS deals continually
with many people, most of whom stay informed as to what is happening: they are
around in the same spaces, are brought up to be deeply involved with each other and
continually ask questions to stay informed. In these circumstances, delegation of
authority and a build-up in bureaucratic levels should not be required to handle high
volumes of business. As function increases, one would expect to find a small
proliferation of small bureaucracies as well as difficulty in handling the problems of
outsiders. In polychronic countries, one has to be an insider6 or else have a "friend"
who can make things happen.7
5Also in HC systems, people in places of authority are personallY and truly
responsible for the actions or sUDordinates down to the lowest man. In tc systems,
responsibility is diffused throughout the system and difficult to pin down.
Paradoxically, when something happens to a low-context svstem, everYone runs for
cover and "tl1e. system" is s.upposed to pr:otect its members. lf a scapegoat is needed,
the most plausIbre low-rankmg scapegoat IS chosen.
6All bureaucracies are oriented inwards, but P-typemore so.
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There is still an interesting point to be made that concerns the act of
administration as it is applied in these two settings. Administration and control of HC
polychronic people is a matter of job analysis. Administration consists of taking each
subordinate's job and identifying the activities that go to make up the job. These are
then named and frequently indicated on the elaborate charts with checks that make it
possible for the administrator to be sure that each function has been performed. In this
way;, itis felt;~. absolute contraIis maintained over the individuaL Yet;. how and when:
each activity is actually attended to is up to the subordinate. To schedule his activities·
for him would be considered as a tyrannical violation orhis individuality; In contrast,
LC M-time people schedule. the activity and leave the analysis of the parts to the.
individual. A P-type analysis keeps reminding the subordinate that his job is a system
and is also part of a larger system. M-type people,. by virtue of compartmentalization,
are less likely to see their activities in context as a part of the larger whole.
Both systems have' strengths as well as weaknesses. There is a limit to the
speed. with. which jobs' can be. analyzed, although once. analyzed" proper reporting can
enable a P-time administrator to handle a surprising number of subordinates and tasks.
Nevertheless, organizations run on thepolychronicmodel are limited in size, depend on
having gifted men at the top and are' slow and cumbersome when dealing with the
business of outsiders or have to perform changes in their system;.. No one likesto'give
up his stereotypes, especially so the' P-type and this is because He actions are by
definition rooted in the past, slow to change and highly stable. Even when it comes to
every day transactions with LC people there are many problems to be solved; He
polychronic- transactions feature preprogrammedinformation that is in the receiver and.
in the setting} with only minimaLinformation in the actuaL coded, explicit,. transmitted
part of the message. LC monochronic transactions are the reverse. Most of the
information must be vested in the explicit code and in great detail in the transmitted
message in order to make up for what is missing in the context. HC communication, in
contrast to LC, is economical, fast, efficient and satisfying; however, time must be
devoted to programming, but not in haste. And this is because HC polychronic
cultures, more than often, place completion of a job in a special category much lower
than the importance of being nice, courteous, considerate and sociable to others. As a
7Anglos generally do 1).ot understand, in fact distrust, the role of the intermediary
and don t Know how to use It themselves.
8What an organism perceives is influenced in four ways: by status, activity,
setting and experience. But in man one must add another crucial dimension: culture.
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consequence, their action chains9 are built around human relations. To be too
obsessional about achieving a work goal at the expense of getting along is considered
by them aggressive, pushy and disruptive. In effect, two people engaged in the same
task, one of them polychronic and the other monochronic, will view the entire process
from very different angles and will have not only a different set of objectives but
different priorities as well.
Applying all the above important culturaLfacts and differences to the- military,
we can then claim that there are-military societies which consist of polychronic high-
context people (P~time, HC) and some other military societies which consist of, in many
ways different, military, which aremonochronic and low-context (M-time, LC).
However, there is one further basic distinction we feel we should make
between the various military organizations. It is the relatively new and bold distinction
of the military which we mentioned in our introduction;. the "institutional" and the
"occupational" military. This is necessary if we \vish to make our study more complete.
C. INSTITUTIONAL VSOCCUPATIONAL MILITARY
1. The 110 Thesis
For nearly fifteen years some behavioral scientists, primarily sociologists,
. interested in military organizations have debated the issue of whether the military is an
institution or an occupation. Charles Moskos, professor of sociology at Northwestern
University, is the preeminent scholar on the subject, having first proposed the
"institution vs. occupation" (I/O) thesis in the mid-seventies as a way of understanding
changes that seemed to be taking place in the all-volunteer forces. Moskos' theoretical
and empirical work on I/O is by no means universally accepted; but it has created a
tremendous amount of interest and stimulated an enormous literature. In June 1985
the U.S. Air Force Academy hosted a conference to examine Moskos' and others'
formulations concerning the U.S and several other foreign military forces. [Ref. 1]
The I/O thesis postulates a continuum on which military organizations can be
placed. At one end the organization is virtually separate and autonomous -
"institutional" - and at the other it mirrors the larger society, or is "occupational".
9An action chain is a set seguence of events, a transaction, in which usuallY two
or more individuals participate. The degree to WhICh one is commited to complete an
action chain is anotlier way' in which cu1tures vary. In general HC cultures, because of
the high involvement peqple have with each other, tend toward high commitment to
complete action chains. This is the main reason behind their characteristic "stability".
In a quite opposite way, that shows their "instability", LC peop,le will break a chain at
the drop of a nat if they don't like the way things are going or If something or someone
better comes along.
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While no military force is at either extreme, and the two conditions are not mutually
exclusive, the notion of such a continuum is useful as a way of understanding how
social trends can affect the military, their decisions and, ultimately, how well they will
perform; it is by no means implied that one is "better" than the other, they are just
different.
2. Institutional
The institutional military is grounded. in its o\vn speciaL values and norms. Its
members are not motivated by self~interest but, rather, by service toa higher goal;
"duty, honour, country" captures the idea. Members of an institutionaL military see
themselves as following a calling or a profession [Ref. 1: p. 2]. Pay is usually lower for
recruits than that ofTered to their age counterparts in the civil sector. There are non-
pecuniary benefits unique to the institutional military, e.g. housing, subsistance,
clothing, early retirement, medical and family care, and the like. Members of an
institutional military resolve their grievances through the chain of command rather
than by collective action. Other attributes are that members are on call 24 hours a day,
they and their families are subject to relatively frequent displacement and they are
subject to a military disciplinary system that differs from civil law. Most members of an
institutional military are subject to the hazards of combat and, in the extreme case,
may have to sacrifice their lives; Finally, military leadership clarifies the meaning .of
service, sets no limits of obligation for military personnel and creates and sustains a
corporate moral code.
It appears that nations with a long history, especially of fighting defensive
wars, are' more likely to develop institutional military. Long detente periods do not
favour institutionalism.
3. Occupational
As characterized by Moskos, at the other end of the continuum, the
occupational military is defined by competition and its effects on wages. Supply and
demand determine the rewards that a serving member receives. For the individual, self-
interest rather than the needs of the organization is paramount. The occupational
model assumes no important differences between a civilian job and a military career, at
least 'with respect to compensation and most aspects of lifestyle. One is paid according
to his skill and degree of availability, i.e people who are in short supply earn more than
those who are not. Further, all pay, allowances and benefits are combined in a single
salary. The work orientation of these military is shifting to a sense of "it's just another
20
job". Further, because the military mission has become so dependent on technology,
the status of some service occupations has changed. The U.S Air Force, for example, is
forced to rely on civilian experts and other "outsiders". The prestige of wearing \\-'lngs
has diminished and those in managerial roles are perceived as having higher status.
[Ref. 1: p. 2]
vVe could say that relatively new and technically oriented nations, that usually
fight offensive: wars or never had the: chance of fighting at all, are'more likely to have
occupational-type military forces. Leadership does not act to shape and clarify values
or moral codes, so consequently the social forces define values by default. Defensive
war is generally the antidote to occupationalism, which could be characterized, with a
small probability of error as a peacetime phenomenon.
4. Cross-national comparison ofsome knmm military
At this point, it would be helpful to try to identify and characterize some of
the well known' military connnunities under the I/O thesis; concept,- as they were
examined during the earlier mentioned conference. [Ref. 1: pp., 5-7]
The French military has been and continue to be more of an institution than
an occupation: there are very few women in uniform; conscription, although stilliri
.force, is diminishing in terms of its democratizing effects;. the army, which. has not been.
in combat for over 20 years, is returning to traditional values like rigor, discipline and
esprit; moonlighting. by servicemen is strictly prohibited by French law; there is an
extreme form ofpay decompression: senior NCOs earn 25 times the salary of recruits;.
and the public images of the French civil service and the military are good: both are
seen as prestigious and competent. We can conclude with the observation that the high
status of the military reflects a sharply rising unemployment rate and a gradual shift
towards more conservative values.
In the UK forces, we can observe that the British regimental system -in which
men are recruited, trained and permanently assigned to a local regiment- has most of
the trappings of an institution: it becomes a family for its members, a home, an instiller
of pride; and for its officers it becomes a social club. There is no room for
moonlighting. Military service in Britain is seen as filling a vital need in the same way
that medical or religious professions do. But the modern military has to sell itself to
prospective applicants in terms of training, adventure, service to country, as it can be
seen by some current advertisements for officer programs. They all emphasize
institutional rather than occupational aspects of service: "It's tough...can you take it?"
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Also, the British military pay policies are supposed to provide a "fair reward for
services" but are not intended to compete with the private sector; there is an elaborate
system of special allowances. In contrasting U.S and UK values that underlie each
nation's military service, we can say that the U.S societal norms are incompatible \vith
maintaining a military force -Americans tend to be distrustful of standing armies- while
in Britain there has long been a close tie between the civil and military sectors.
Illc "YVest Germany,_ Bundeswehr enjoy a high degree of popular legitimacy
because its defensive role is seen as important; proximity to Warsaw Pact forces isa.
constant reminder. Germany has both conscript and volunteer soldiers; the latter go
through a trial enlistment and, as. regular soldiers, they earn special education benefits.
The orientation of the military is primarily occupational, with much training oriented
towards civilian jobs. The use of conscription. is a "guarantee of intellectual
interchange" between' the military and the general public,but conscription. is not
popular. Unlike the French, the Germans have a high degree of pay compression: the
highest ranking enlisted earns only 2.2 times as much as a recruit; Also;. in contrast to
the French force, there is a good deal ofmoonlighting among military personnel and
such work. is seen. as"an important leisure activity:'. The Bundeswehr is a. wholly new
creatiollc of. post-war. Germany and its founders deliberately sought to' make' it
occupational' in character; for obvious, reasons. There is" however, a generation' gap'in'
that young NCOs favour. the present arrangement while, older regulars are' more
inclined towards a separate, institutional military.
In the Dutch military, on the surface the force appears to be one of the most
unconventional in the world: unionized conscripts, 70 percent reserve, and a high
degree of occupational orientation. Yet,. there is a deep sense ofthe need for an armed·
force and if there is war the Dutch will support. the military by their participation;
The Greek forces were characterized primarily as being institutional, perhaps
more so than any other Western force. Institutionalism is interwoven into Greece's
continuous struggle for existence, through the aeons. Although there has been
conscription for 40 years, the Greek military maintains its own separate norms and
lifestyle. There is a high degree of pay decompression: a draftee earns S6/month and a
senior sergeant's pay is 5500. Military \vives are accorded status commensurate with
their husband's rank. Moonlighting is not only strictly prohibited by law, but it is also
rarely conceived by the military themselves. There are separate legal systems, and all
crimes involving military are tried in their own military courts. An unspoken public
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concern is that an institutional military can lead to another takeover of the
government, not an unknown occurrence in Greece all through its long history. Since
the mid-1970s there have been moves towards more democratization of the forces:
some pay compression has occured, separate recruiting for technical occupations only
is done, conscripts are given more freedom, women are slowly, but not too successfully,
introduced into the forces, and there is agitation for a military union. The draft will
continue to operate (although with reduced- terms of service) and we can conclude that
there is strong public support for the military.
In the Australian forces, according to a recent attitude survey, there is a high
institutional orientation among army officers, although the navy and air force are more
evenly divided. Among enlisted, the non-technical tend to be institutionally grounded,
while technical NCOs see themselves as job holders. The air force pilots have the
highest professional or institutional orientation of all groups when they are on flying
status, but if they have non-flying jobs their orientation shifts to "it's just a job". A
relatively new Australian policy that emphasizes- officer education - undergraduate
degrees, etc. - may be counterproductive: those officers with more formal education are
institutionally oriented and less likely to remain for long careers. The Australian forces
do not use retention bonuses, but retirement pensions are affected significantly by
length of service: A commander retiring~ith 20- years of service receives. a 540,000 tax-
free lump sum payment in addition to his annual pension (which includes cost'-of-living
provisions), much like a Greek officer. The national industrial relations climate is
changing in a parallel development with the military: surveys of active duty personnel
have shown an increase from 30 percent to 70 percent favouring "collectivism" in the
last six years.
The Israeli armed forces have some peculiarities.lO Israeli Defence Force
(IDF) has a permanent cadre that is 10 percent of the total force. Of the remainder, 65
percent are reservists and 25 percent conscripts. There is universal service required of
all citizens who reach age 18: three years for men, two years for women. All former
military men remain in an active reserve status until the age of 55, women until 34.
Members of the small permanent cadre are not "career oriented" and they tend to leave
active duty at a relatively early age. Legitimacy of the armed forces stems from a
strong sense of obligation. Conscripts serve without payment and, on the basis of the
nation's history, with a high probability of injury or death. Reservists serve 40 to 60
lOMost of them are also found in Switzerland's forces.
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days a year and are compensated only by their employers - or not at all if they are
self-employed. There are few perks accorded military people; only air force pilots are
provided base housing (because they are on permanent alert status). Because the
country is so small, it is rare that a family is ever relocated. The larger society has high
regard for the IDF. Social psychological studies have shown that senior officers enjoy
prestige ratings of 96 (on a scale of 100), higher than those accorded religious or
academic figures. Veterans' discharge papers show their fitness ratings, a practice that
can affect job offers. In the last decade or so, the IDF has shifted from a
"militarocratic" to a democratic model because of public criticism of the 1973 and 1982
wars. However, the size of the IDF has nearly doubled and there have been qualitative
changes: officers have become more professional in their work but narrower in their
perspectives of external matters. Moreover, during the Lebanese war, some highly
regarded senior officers requested to be relieved and some reservists refused to answer
their caU:'ups.
Finally, the U.S military appear to be on the occupational side of the I/O
continuum, with the Air Force at the far end of that side. Career military people are
largely motivated by self-interest and the military mission has become very much
dependent on technology and budget.. The occupational mentality is a reflection of the
pervasiveness of economics. Historical evidence supports the notion that most people
join the military out of financial need and that higher values come later (Ref. 1: p. ST.
The mixture of races and ethnicities in the forces and their relations cannot favour
institutionalism, with a slight exception for the Marines, because "Marines do
everything together" [Ref. 1: p. 5]. The global commitment of the U.S military forces
and the revolution in labour force participation by American women has created
serious conflicts: military men have added responsibilities at home because of their
wives' careers, and wives are increasingly reluctant to accept the demands on them
(e.g., to move frequently) made by the military. The grovvth of interest and investment
in family service programs and in improving cohesion reflects the military's concerns
about reducing these conflicts, promoting, however, occupationalism even more.
D. THE CONNECTION
Let us then try to express a conclusion that could summarize what appears to
look like a fair result of our research, up to this point.
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As things become more and more complex, as they inevitably must 'with
monochronic, fast-evolving, high"pitched, high-tech, highly computerized LC military
societies, the more difficult it becomes for the polychronic, slow-changing, high-
filtering, low-tech, hardly computerized HC military to interact, communicate and
exchange information with them. This is something to be expected, since they apply a
different degree of filtering, in trying to cope with the overload of information they are
both facing;- However,. since they both need tcitake the besLpossible decisions for the'
conunon benefit, some way ofmore effective communication must be found.
One wonders if it is possible to develop strategies for balancing. the two
apparently contradictory needs of the He military: the need to adapt and change (by
moving in the low-context direction) and the need for stability (high-context). History
is full of examples of nations and institutions that failed to adapt by holding on to
high-context modes and norms too long. The fact is that one cannot back-up \'vi.th
technology; once it is established. The instability of low-context societies; however;. on
the present-day scale is· quite new to mankind. And furthermore;. there is not enough
experience to show us how to deal with change at such fast rate.
At this point, it appears that we could attempt to establish the desired
connection of all the above with the discussed and interesting I/O thesis: institutionaL
military are. or· have to be;. in the: whole,. P-type HC people, while' the occupational are"
usually ?vt·type LC people. This conclusion, will hopefully allow us to realize the
difficulties in attempting to persuade an institutional military to understand, appreciate,
adopt and cope, from then on, with the much needed transition into high technology
and computerization.
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III. THE DIFFUSION OF AN INNOVATION
A. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT
In order to be able to introduce the institutionaL military into a "new" highly
technological computerized environment, different to their norms and with different
ways; of functioning, communicating and even, thinking and living (for a,good deal of
them), we'must proceed systematically and \vith. great caution, keeping in mind alLthe
facts and ideas. that we mentioned so far. There is no time to be wasted. \Ve must
approach or communicate with them in a speciaLway.
Until recently, most such approaches have been based upon a linear model of
comm~nication, defined as the process by which messages are transferred from a
source to a receiver. Such a one~way view of human communication describes certain
types of communication; many ways of"passing over" new ideas do indeed consist of
one'individual, suchasa change' agent, informing a potential adopter. about anew idea.
But many other approaches are more accurately described by a convergence model, in
which communication is defined. as a processin which the participants create and share
information with one' another to reach a mutual understanding [Ref. 5:p.. 63].
Conceptually;. we will use the two important concepts of uncertainty and
information. Uncertaiiuy is the degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived '
with respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative probabilities of these
alternatives. Information is a difference in matter-energy that affects uncertainty in a
situation where a choice exists among a set of alternatives [ReL 5: p. 64]. The concept
of information is a favourite in the' field of communication research. The~ field really
began to grow as an intellectual enterprise once Claude Shannon and 'Warren Weaver
proposed, in 1949, a theory of communication that was organized around the notion of
information [Ref. 6].
One kind of uncertainty is generated by. an innovation, defined as an idea,
practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual, an organization or another
unit of adoption. An innovation presents an individual or an organization with a new
alternative or alternatives, with new means of solving problems. But the probabilities of
the new alternatives being superior to previous practice are not exactly known by the
individual problem-solver. Thus, they are motivated to seek further information about
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the innovation in order to cope with the uncertainty that it creates [Ref. 7: xviii].
Newness in an innovation need not just involve new knowledge. Someone may have
known about an innovation for some time but not yet developed a favourable or
unfavourable attitude toward it, nor have adopted or rejected it. The "newness" aspect
may well be expressed in terms of persuasion or a decision to adopt.
B. WHATIS DIFFUSION
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain
channels over time among the members of a social system. It is a special type' of
communication, in that the messages are concerned with new ideas. Communication is
a process in which participants create and share information with one another in order
to reach a mutual understanding. This definition implies that communication is a
process of convergence (or divergence) as two or more individuals' exchange
information. It is the neV\lless of an idea that gives diffusion its special character,
because then uncertainty is involved; and uncertainty implies a lack of predictability, of
structure, of information. I I
1. Technological innovations, information and uncertainty
Presently, almost all of the new ideas are technological innovations, and we
often see that "innovation" and "technology" are used as synonyms. An interesting
definition of technology [Ref. 7: p. 12] that in~olves uncertainty (and information) is
that "technology is a design for instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty in the
cause-effect relationship involved in achieving a desired outcome".
Technology usually has two components: (1) a hardware aspect, consisting of
the tool that embodies the technology as material or physical objects, and (2) a
software aspect, consisting of the information base for that tool. For example, we
often speak of (1) "computer hardware", consisting of semiconductors, transistors,
electrical connections and the metal frame to protect these electronic components, and
(2) "computer software", consisting of the coded commands, instructions and other
information aspects of this tool that allow us to use it to extend human capabilities in
solving certain problems. But even though the software component of a technology is
often not so apparent to observation, we should not forget that technology almost
always represents a mixture of hardware and software aspects.
11 In fact, information represents one of the main means of reducing uncertainty.
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According to the above definition of technology, it is a means of uncertainty
reduction for individuals (or organizations) that is made possible by the information
about cause-effect relationships on which the technology is based. This information
usually comes from scientific R&D activities when technology is being developed.
Thus, there is generally an implication that technological innovations have at least
some degree of benefit or advantage for its potential adopters. But this advantage is
not always very clear or impressive, at least to the eyes orthe intended adopters.
A technological innovation, computers for example, creates one kind of
uncertainty in the minds of potential adopters about its expected consequences, as well
as representing an opportunity for reduced uncertainty in another sense (that of the
information base of the technology). The second type of potential uncertainty
reduction, the information embodied in the innovation itself, represents the possible
efficacy of the innovation in solving an individual's known need or problem; this
advantage provides the motivation that pushes one to exert effort in order to learn
more about the innovation. Once such information-seeking activities have reduced the
uncertainty about the innovation's expected consequences to an acceptable level for
the individual (or organization), then a decision to adopt it or reject it can be made.
Thus, the innovation-decision process is essentially an information-seeking and
information-processing activity in. which the individual or the organization is motivated
to reduce uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages of the innovation (of the
computer, in our case).
2. Characteristics of innovations
Technological innovations are not, in general, always diffused and adopted
rapidly, especially when He P-time people are concerned; and by now we should be
able to guess why. But again, the rate of adoption depends on the adopter as much as
on the innovation itself; it took five or six years for the (electronic) pocket calculator to
reach widespread adoption in the United States, while the HC Japanese and Chinese
still prefer to use the abacus for their everyday transactions (although they
manufacture calculators at a rate faster than anyone else). On the other hand, new
ideas such as the metric system or using seat belts in cars may require several decades
to reach complete use. It is mainly the following characteristics of innovations, as
perceived by individuals, that help to explain their different rate of adoption.
1. Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better
than the idea that it supersedes. The degree of relative advantage may be
measur~d in. economic terms, .but cultural, social-prestige factors, convemence
and satlsfactlOn are also often Important components.
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2. Compatibility, is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being
consIstent with the existmg values, context, past experiences and needs of the
potential adopters. An idea that is not comnatible with the prevalent values and
norms of a cultural and social Estem will not be adopted as rapidly as an
innovation that is compatible. The adoption of an incompatible innovation
often requires the prior adoption of a new value svstem. For example, a He p.
time adopter of ~omputer technology should first 'adopt the M-time values and
ways of conununIcatmg.
3. Complexity' is the degree to which an innovation is p'erceived as difficult to
understand and use. ~If one needs to develop new skills to understand the
innovation, itwill surely take much longer for the desired adoption.
4~. Trialabilitv is· the degree'towhich an innovation may be experimented.withona o
limited trial basis. i~njnnovation that is trialable represents lessuncertaintv toth~ individual who is considering it for adoption, as it is possible to learn. by
domg.
5. Observability is the degree to which the results ofan innovation are visible to
oth~rs.. The. easier one can see the results, the more likely he or she is to adopt
themnovatIOn.
These are not the only qualities that affect adoption rates, but it is indicated
that they are the most important ones in explaining rate of adoption [Ret: 7: p; 14]~
3. Heterophily~ ignorance and, diffusion
An obvious principle of human communication is. that the transfer of ideas
occurs most frequently between, two' individuals who are alike, similar, or homophilus
[Ret: 7: p. 18]. Homophily is the degree to which pairs of individuals or systems who
interact are similar in certain attributes, such· as culture,_ beliefs, education, social
status,. and the like.12 Ina free-choice situation~ when an individual can interact with.
any~ one ofa: number of otheriildividuals, there is a strong tendency for him to choose
someone who is most like him-orherselt: However, one ofthe most distinctive problems~
in the communication of innovations is that the participants are usually quite
heterophilous. vVhen a change agent, for instance, is much more technically competent
than his "client", they simply do not speak the same language- and their communication
is ineffective.13 The effectiveness oftheir communication depends on the complexity oC
the task to be carried-out and the' ignorance that they share; that is, they are more than
likely unaware of the important differences that exist between their cultures, their
"timing", their context, even the fact that they are indeed heterophilous. Instead,
misunderstandings may be attributed to other irrelevant' factors like personality or
12This term and its opposite, heterophiiY., derive from the Greek words "homoios"
and "h~terqs", meaning aIik.e/~qual and chtI:ereI).t/not. equa,l Jrespectively). Thus,
homophtly hterally means afhhatlon or commUnICatIOn WIth a slffi11ar person.
13In fact, when two individuals are identical regarding their technological grasp
of an innovation, no diffusion can occur as there is no new information to exchange.
The ve~ nature of difTusio~ .demands that at least some degree of heterophily De
present oetween the two partICIpants.
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political direction. So, the whole communication process and the desired diffusion of a
technological innovation to the adopter may become very difficult, painfully slow or
even uncertain at times.
4. The Innovation-decision process
Therefore, in order to achieve'a successful diffusion, the following steps of the
innovation-decision process, suggested by Rogers [Ref. 7: p; 36] ought to be successfully
completed;", a process through. which, an individual (or other decision~making unit)
passes from' first: knowledge' of an, innovation to forming an attitude toward the
innovation, to' a decision to adopt or reject, to implementation of the'new idea, and to
confirmation of this decision. The decision-maker seeks information at the various
stages in' the innovation-decision process in order to decrease uncertainty about the







Knowledge occurs when a decision-maker is exposed to the' innovation's
existence; obtains'software information' that is embedded in a technological innovation
and gains some' understanding of how it' functions and· of what it has to offer.
Persuasion occurs when a decision maker forms a favourable or unfavourable attitude
toward the innovation. Decision occurs when a decision maker engages in activities
that lead to a choice to adopt or reject the innovation. At the persuasion and decision
stages;, the decision maker seeks innovation-evaluation information in order to reduce
uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. Implementation occurs when
a decision maker puts an innovation into use. Confirmation occurs when a decision
maker seeks reinforcement of an innovation decision that has already been made, but
'he or she may reverse this previous decision if exposed to conflicting messages about
the innovation.
c. SUPPLYING THE KNOWLEDGE
Since we are interested in persuading an institutional military to form a
favourable attitude towards a given innovation, namely the introduction and the
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utilization of the computer into its decision process, we must carry it through the very
first and fundamental step of the innovation-decision process; the acquisition of the
(favourable) knowledge. The best person to approach and attract would be the
institutional military decision maker, for two simple reasons: (1) because he is the one
who makes the decisions, after all and (2) because he is the one who benefits directly
from the adoption of such innovation. Therefore, in the following chapters we will
carefully attempt to provide a framework for the transfer of such desired knowledge,. in
order to prepare the grounds for his persuasion and decision to adopt, trying not to
put him ofT by exposing him to technical and mathematical details. It is important to
proceed in such a way in order to counter a uniform pattern of objection that occurs
whenever it is proposed to use technical and mathematical methods in a field in which
such methods are not traditional.
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IV. ON HIGH TECHNC~LrvCZPJT"~)iPzl\lfo%EEDFOR MILITARY
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to help a hypothetical High-Context (HC)
institutional military decision maker, a Greek officer in our case, to realize and
appreciate the current information and computer revolution.
To achieve the above, we will outline the existing status of the computer and the
possible future development and applications to the Navy. The importance of the
computer as a tool will be investigated, as well as the possible related problems, in an
attempt to see if the use of the computer is likely to be beneficial for the institutional
military decision maker. The expected consequences of the impact that the computer is
soon bound to have on every area of military life, operations and personnel will be
mentioned.
The transfer of this preliminary knowledge is necessary in order to be able to
discuss a desired application, namely to introduce a certain degree of computerization
into his existing decision making process, which is now based on a nearly non
computer-assisted scheme.
We will address the issue by refering to the Navy, but it must be kept in mind
that the same discussion applies to any other military service. So, this chapter will
have the form of a hypothetical advisory report or letter to an equally hypothetical top
level Greek naval decision maker, an Admiral. Although he may be a man of wit and
open mind, and he may have given indications of a quite unusual technological
understanding and appreciation, he is still a conservative and very busy Admiral who
prefers to learn something new at his own pace and certainly not in public, to avoid
possible and unnecessary embarrassment. Therefore this introduction should be short,
quite conservative, simple, rational and persuasive; not making obvious our apparent
conununication gap, with very few (if necessary) numbers or new terms and with a
certain touch of history (since most Admirals have the, often successful tendency to
tum into scholastic historians in their retirement).14
14What follows could be a draft, not an actual reportjreconunendation format
that we would really turn in to an Adnural.
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B. A LETTER TO AN ADMIRAL
In order to be able to discuss the relationship between the modern device which
is called digital computer and the Navy and its people, we must make several
reasonable assumptions concerning both the Navy and the computer. These
assumptions are:
1. That the Navv will continue in the next 25 vears to have. in general, the same
mission and objectives that it has had and s6.ll has todav:theseare "to support
and protect: bv any means, our national interests over-the vitalnationaL area"
and to be able -to deter any possible attack by any potential enemy".
2. That the State will remain determined and able to support financially the
Navv's objectives -at least for the near future- and that the Navv will trv its
best"tooptimize the methods and procedures required/adopted in meeting these
objectives, including beneficial tedinologicaLinnovations.
3. That the Navv will continue to sutTer the existing shortal!e in personnel relative
to its need. due to our unfavourable rate of population-increase, compared to
that of our' possible enemies.
4. That the technological progress is closely related to today's tremendous
accumulated amount of knowled2:e and information and that it is much more
difficulttoday to' keep up with. suCh rapid progress than it ever was before~.
5. That the micro'-electronics and computer, revolutions are not only hereto stav,
but are likelY to expand in every fieldd of human activity, due to its obvious
positive contribution to the progress of our species, so tar.
6. That the superpowers vvill continue:
a. to make the best use of hil!h technology and computer power for the
benetlt of their defense: andtfie sup-port ortheir internationa interestsjand.
that thevwill not go back to old-lashioned and. romantic hot Of cola war
methodi
b; to ~upport and p'rovid~ their aUieswi-th updated technology, according to
theIr Importance In theIr respectIve allIance
7. That a Navy's effectiveness was, is and will be inter-related to the beneficial
utilization of the current technolo2:v, the implementation of which will not
necessarily be always "clean" or ethical .
8. That whenever we come across moral or cultural problems, that some p'eople
fear as dangerous because of the man'-machine interaction, we will be able to
restore the -confidence and acceptance of the people concerned. It is our
responsibilitv to keep technology III touch with tiuman, nature and culture and
to make certain that the tools -of computing do not overpower those that rely
on them.
Probably some of the above assumptions look too obvious to be mentioned.
However, we have good reason to believe that they must be remembered, since our
modern society is passing at this very moment through the most difficult point of its
existence. It is neither our intention nor necessary to go through these reasons in this
study. The point is that society, and by extension military society, was never as
complicated as today. Moreover, the contrast or even the conflicts of the involved
cultures are as obvious as never before. One reason is that low-context (LC) societies
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adjust quickly and much more effectively to technological changes than high-context
(He) ones [Ref. 2: p. 39].
1. The Navy and the computer
But let us see in what fields of our Naval activities the computer can help us
or should be expected to be able to help in the future. Is, for example, the' computer
going to solve our present and future problems and help us expand and improve the
power and the effectiveness ofour.Na:vy? 'What do we need.to achieve the above?
We are indeed in need of "something" that 'will be able to deal. with our
problems 'with pre-determined:
a. speed,. accuracy, reliability, predictability,. patience
and "something" that
b. can work 24 hours a dav, even in a hostile environment, without lZetting bored
or frustrated or sick. with no need for social security and tosociaTlze, with the
minimum rate of. errors and at the same time saving us time, money, potential
and~posslblypreCIous·man-power..
This must be avery devoted. and determined worker or tool or device;: which is
exactly what the computer. has already proven to be~ But thereis, nothing magic behind
the computer.. It may not be able as: such to completely solve alLour problems; but. it
certainly has been a. great tool to help us take the fastest and most error,.free decisions
possible,. by doing much of the hard work as well as performing tasks impossible for
the humans; At the same time it allows us. to concentrate on the' final decisions, orto
develop new' skills and new projects. The modern Navy has to cope\vithan increasing
amount of information, at an increasingly high rate of speed, that has to be stored and
processed. vVe cannot possibly hope that we can manage without computer aid. It
makes' no difference if the information is-.. about a missile launched at us, the best
choice and. procurement of a new weapon system, the up-coming shortage' of sterilized
bandages, helicopter fuel or 9 X 16 heavy duty destroyer's boiler nuts; they can all
contribute to the loss orour life or freedom.
It has been suggested that one of the biggest problems science must face in
the next 20 years is the "explosion of information" the computer itself has brought
about. Most young scientists are ignorant of what was done 10 years ago (and so are
most young officers) even in their own fields of specialization. They are both
condemned to (mostly) repeat the mistakes of their elders and to (occasionally) repeat
their accomplishments. This can now be avoided by using computers to access the
enormous mass of information which exists in large data bases at many different places
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of the worldt or exchange information and ideas with other users of similar interests.
The access can be possible through high speed, highly reliable and easy to use
computer networks that virtually criss-cross the globe. However, they must follow the
safety rules which apply when using networks: carelessness in networks killst a high
level of security costs.
The most indicated way to proceed is to utilize the scientific approach, which
dictates that we go from simple. things to the more complicated ones. Non-scientific
oriented people usually try to cope directly with complex situations, use their intuition
and covered behind the much acclaimed shield of "experience" may end up conuniting
tragic mistakes. However, behind the use of this machine is not only the scientific
approach, but a terribly fast one. What could· be a good example of the processing
speed of a typical computer is the fact that it took a mainframe only about 55 seconds
to process and print this thesis.
We should not be forgetting that our era is an extraordinary and very high
pitched one. Changes happen very rapidly. Such will be the future to come. In a
rapidly changing situation, intuition and experience are counter-productive, because
they are not given enough time to receive and process the feedback of new things and
ideas. This is something extremely important in our HC military society. In such an
environment one needs computer literacy and simulation. It is very difficult to come to
the real results by the direct study of reality, because the conditions can change as
much as our opinions on what we observe. But with computer simulations we can
associate all symptoms to find (or indicate) the illness. The study of a simulation can
bring out more real results. \Ve can have passive simulations for study as much as we
can have active simulations for designing, such as the C3I functions that currently find
wide application in the Navy.
Mentioning simulation; we cannot help but recall what happened at our Naval
War College recently.I5 It was the day of the official presentation of the new state-of-
the-art computerized Tactical Combat and War Game Simulator and the Fleet
Admiral, in his speech, was really running out of praise for the new "machine". Then,
near the end, facing the grand total of his senior officers and ships' Commanding
Officers, he said to the Chief of the Navy (with distinct sarcasm) that now it would be
easier for him to evaluate correctly the abilities of his officers to command and to take
correctly the most indicated decisions, under simulated real-time battle conditions. As
I5\Ve are sure the Admiral remembers it.
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he said, he never really felt that he had that chance during fleet maneuvers, but now he
'11 16WI •
Besides its amusing side, however, this incident alone easily demonstrates not
only the present, but also the future capability of sophisticated computer systems to
give invaluable help in various Strategic, Tactical, Administrative and Managerial
situations, however complex, cumbersome or unpleasant they may be. Moreover, did
it ever occur to us that we might sometimes train Captains to make the wrong
decisions? vVe may have done this without realizing it, possibly because we are already
transformed into inflexible conservatives by virtue of our age or by the very system
itself, by the time we become instructors. Our present computer experience allows us,
though, to believe that in the future, education and special training can be carried out
by the computers more effectively, insuring better understanding and quicker and more
positive results [Ref. 8: p. 275].
But how do the HC, institutional-type military feel about all this? At this
point let us recall our last assumption; people usually fear that [Ref. 8: p. 20]:
1. they may lose their privacy
2. they may lose their job or its prestige
3. they may be given fewer choices by the computer
4. they may not be appreciated any longer or become dehumanized
5. computers cannot or should not be trusted
The interaction between human and machine will become part of the Navy's
daily routine. However, personnel must not be allowed to become frustrated or anxious
about their ability to use machines or the impact of a machine on their life or career.
Time must be taken to integrate computers properly so that they are viewed not as a
threat, but rather as a useful tool. People will not use machines if they do not feel
comfortable about their ability to do so, or if they do not trust the answers because
they do not understand the processes involved.
Human experience must still be utilized. The wealth of information a person
has gathered during a career will be questioned if people do not feel that their
knowledge and experience is appreciated and useful. Moreover, people do not want to
be inconvenienced and will not use a tool if it is not readily accessible. All new systems
must be designed with the user in mind, while still maintaining the importance of
security for the computer system. A comprehensive history of each system should be
16We would rather not mention th~ reaction of the Commanding Officers.
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maintained and personnel need to be flexible enough to work around a failed system in
cases of emergency. This is very important because a big controversy of using a
computer system is the overdependence that may result [Ref. 8: p. 470].
To ensure the above, a new specialty of officer must, we repeat, must be
established; the Information Systems Officer (ISO), that will allow a group ofofficers
to be trained in all phases of computer technology/programming, hardware and
management~ vVith a comprehensive background in the computer field and their own
, career path, these officers will be able to provide help and direction to Navy users and
to maintain continuity of the systems Navy-wide.
The rest of the Navy community will only need to have a general knowledge
of wha t computers may be used for and how to access the system they need to do their
jobs. All the designed applications should therefore be flexible, interactive and "user-
friendly".
lil this way, the' computer will" with an almost certain degree of success
(judging from its present rate of development) be able to guide us into better analysis,
decisions and solutions when dealing with the increasingly' complex' future- systems that
we are bound to be facing. This can be achieved and enhanced by using more
sophisticated operations research methods and techniques. To give only a few
examples, consider~ the decision-making steps required to be takenin:
1. the' alreadvcomplicated amphibious operations, that reqpire an amazingdelZree',
of synchronization, cooperation with other branches or the armed forces and
information exchange and evaluation; to be carried out successfully and with
the minimum sacri.fice "
2., the weapons acquisition process
3. the submarine operations,
4. the small but speedY 2:uided missile boats, where we. alreaqy use aircraft., to
expand, our horizon '.vim their radars" in order to launch an Exocet from 60 or
more miles. Imagine if the aircraft could carry a small replica of your boat's
guidance cOmPuter, that, YOU could remotelY control. Then YOU onlY need to
supply your cxocet with more range and vou don't need to get nearer to vour
target. 'With tomorrow's computers you could have sucll a compact" and
sopllisticated replica of your launching svstem. Or, instead of an aircraft, vou
could use anotlier boat "in your squadron which is nearer your target, but nas
already run out of het deadly load.
There already exist many "ofT-the shelf' software packages that can be used to
assist us in taking these kind of decisions with much better precision and higher
probability of final success.
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2. The Electronic Battleship
Of course, such thinking should not lead us to visualize a remote-controlled
electronic battleship 25 years from now, with no need for a crew. We will always be in
need ofa crew, but it will be smaller, smarter and probably a lot happier. Her Captain
will be there on the bridge, and he may as well be making history if he decides that he
should dare to do something totally against any other human or computer advice' or
expectation, basing his decisions on the thousands-of-years'-old inherited to: him
seamanship, experience and' intuition that overides computer assistance' at this stage: of
the naval operation;. But untilthat moment, we\vill have to make sure that our future
Captain will have all the knowledge and the current computer-power and technology to
back him up, to be there in the first place. Because it is expected that through fancy
future simulation methods (which we believe them to be the computer's most valuable
future task), the computer will· be able to' guarantee the most accurate, ambiguous-tree'
and safely positive pattern recognitions and air-sea-land surveillance ever: achieved
-through hostile, poor visibility or long distance situations'- something that human
perception is not capable of performing vvithout a serious degree ofuncertainty or
error; Naval operations will be carried out more successfully and accurately, especially
since the future "machines" are expected to give us even better and earlier predictions
of the weather condition and changes, a well known uncertainty factor,. critical for the'
accomplishment of any naval operation.
3. Conclusions
This is the kind of battleship and the kind of Captain and machinery we
should expect to face in battle some 25 years from now. So, we must place ourselves
among them, otherwise we are condemned to destruction or be at their mercy.
Nothing will be a secret to the strong one anymore and the ones that willnor manage
or refuse to "keep up 'With the Jones's" will be destined to extinction or will be forced
to "agree". We believe that perhaps this is the whole point behind the arms race.
Eventually, the only ones that you could safely shoot at will be either the naive or the
ignorant children. 'Would you shoot then? Conversely, this brings the computer-power
to eventually play the role of the international non-human pacifier.
Now, this is where one can innocently ask: "\-Vho is more powerful: the man
or the computer?" But when we reach such a point, the question will be, "What should
we do now that we have all the power we always wanted to support our naval
purposes?" In the past we were looking for this power to help us carry out our
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mission. In the future our questions may be, "Should we reconsider the objectives and
missions of our Navy? Would we ha.ve to reconsider our very first and fundamental
assumption?" These are the questions that the Admiral will have to consider and
decide upon. Whatever he decides, though, we must primarily face the present and the
near future.
So, to come back to the Navy, since we missed the industrial revolution due to
the vagaries of history, we must join, and we are perfectly capable of participating in
the present computer revolution. After all, the Romans were the engineers and the
Greeks were the brains. Once we achieve a firm grasp of computer literacy, the only
road to follow is the road of computer software production and utilization. It is too
late to start in the computer hardware area, like the Romans (Le., any technologically
advanced society) have; hardware is getting cheaper and smaller as time passes and it
has almost reached its (presently) expected limits.17
\Ve have not attempted to put our fmger on future computer applications
that will be of great importance to the Navy, or to claim that "everything is going to
be O.K" in our future. All we have tried to do is to point out the fundamental
importance of the computer to the future of the Navy and that, we must try very hard
to keep pace with the computer revolution, provided we are still interested in
maintaining our freedom, dignity and prosperity; otherwise we will miss the boat
completely. This conclusion looks inevitable if we examine the past rationally and
critically; and we believe that this is the best way to look into the future. Because,
repeating the words of George Santayana, a nineteenth-century philosopher, "those
who do not learn from history are destined to repeat it".
17The natural limits to computer hardware are set by the speed of light (they
have it), by the size of the molecule of matter (they are almost there) ana by the
overheating of the machinery involved (the Romans will surely take care of this).
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v. INTRODUCTION TO M0rJl.fkl~8 AND MODERN DECISION
A. THE SCIENCE OF DECISION :MAKING
All of us have encountered situations and problems that have required the
making of a decision: the choosing between competing opportunities or alternatives.
Most everyday problems are resolved without too much difficulty or without serious
consequence if the"correct" alternative is not selected, from among the many available
ones. There are problems, however, for which we, as decision makers, want to do our
utmost to ensure that the best possible solution is chosen. Such problems occur in
most professions: in the military, business, industry and government, as well as in
personal situations. There are hard choices and hard decisions when you are in the
field!
Since the 1940s, our ability to understand, structure and resolve decision
problems has improved tremendously. This is due to increased study of applied
problems by mathematicians and other scientists, and the development of new
mathematical techniques and the power of the computer. A new science of decision
making has been evolving. This has produced a set of ideas, approaches and procedures
that can be considered to form a modem framework and focus attention on its
centerpiece: the mathematical model.
Starting with the Operations Research carried out in Great Britain and the
United States during vVorld War II, there has been a tremendous effort over the last 35
years devoted to scientific and mathematical analysis of various military, economic,
industrial and biomedical systems. The focus has been on decision-making, since it
turns out that much of what is involved in the feasible operation of a system can be
meaningfully interpreted in terms of decision processes.
It is claimed that decision making is more art than science and that intuition and
experience are the main resources of a decision maker. While we are in no position to
refute this view, we do believe that most decision-making situations can be understood
and handled better by the application of the more disciplined approach to problem
analysis that is imposed by Systems Analysis. With better understanding (and more
precise inputs and analysis structure) come better decisions; the science of decision
making is still developing. [Ref. 9: p. 3]
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1. Decision-aiding models
For most decision problems, an experimental setting cannot be imposed upon
the system in question or the system under study. We are constrained in any attempt
to evaluate alternative solutions to a problem using the real-world system as a test bed.
Therefore;. we must- make a deliberate effort to abstract the needed information that
"describes" the problem and system. This information must then be organized to form
a substitute fOIthe actual or contemplated system. In this way;,we' can: now work on
the actual problem but within a system that we artificially created by abstracting the"
suitable information. Abstracting, the gathering and organizing ofi:nformation, is the
basic process for all decision making, If conducted properly, it will lead to clear and
concise statement of the problem; an understanding of what alternative solutions, if
any, are possible; and indications of means of choosing among alternatives.
The term information is used here in. a most general sense and all parts of the
problem are covered by related information. Recause- a decision- problem includes the
new system's definition, resources,. constraints (political, economical, organizational)
and actual' or simulated data.
The hope is that once this information has been gathered (not an easy task for
most problems), a structure or framework can be developed as an aid to the analysis.
Certain principles for analyzing the information content of decision problems have
evolved over the- past few years .. They combine to form the powerful concepts of
decision-aidtng models. As usual, Shakespeare' had the words for it:
Whenwe mean to build,
We first survey the plot. then draw the model
And when we see [he ji.gure ot' [he house,
Thenmusr we rate the cost oJ the erection;
(King Henry The Fourth, Part II, Act I, scene 3)
Models are used as aids in the understanding of a problem. As an aid to
decision making, a properly constructed and valid model can predict the outcome of
each possible solution and sometimes even the optimal solution. Thus, we can establish
some scale that allows us to compare alternative choices and to select one of them for
implementation The criterion according to which we decide on the selection of an
alternative may vary; it can be the cost, or some other measure of utility or
effectiveness, or even a judgmental and intuitive criterion.
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Models have been classified into three basic types. The iconic model looks like
what it is supposed to represent, like an architectural model or a planetarium
representing the celestial sphere. The analogue model relates the properties of the entity
being modeled with other properties that are both descriptive and meaningful, like the
concept of time as described by the hands and markings of a clock. Finally, the
symbolic model or the mathematical/logical model represents a symbolic description of
the process or problem under investigation, like the famous translation into
quantitative terms oftherelation e = mc2 [Ret: 9: p. 15]:
In parallel, models can be predictive, normative, descriptive or prescnpnve.
For the decision situations that we will be refering to in this thesis, the model
structures' wilY be mathematical'and prescriptive.
Many military decision makers rely on their mental models and their intuition
to make decisions. The human mind's ability to resolve situations by intuition based
upon experience is not well understood, but is:quite remarkable. A mathematicaLmodel
should try to encompass, explain and extend the intuitive concepts. A model might
challenge our intuition about a system, and' any counterintuitive results may only mean
that we did not correctly understand the problem complexities in the first place, or that
important constraints were ignored. Moreover, we should be able to use the model to
solve any inconsistencies.
2. Elements ofa model
A model is a way of abstracting the real' world so that not only the static
picture of the real phenomenon is obtained, but also the dynamic (stochastic)
interrelationships. "With an appropriate model of a real-world situation, we should be
able to predict certain outcomes or determine how the real world would behave if we
implemented a particular alternative decision.
Models have two major components: variables and relationships. In many
real situations, it is possible to enumerate thousands of relationships and/or18
variables. The skill of the model builder enables him to capture the essence -only the
important variables and relationships- to produce a meaningful and useful model. In
the model, the variables represent either numerical values (which are counts,
measurements, results, etc.) or codes (which identify items, people, projects, etc.). The
relationships (equations, constraints, inequalities) are expressed in procedures for
.18i\bybe w~ really, need ,to use just "or". It appears to us that "or" always
contams the meanmg or"and/ or .
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computing the values of certain variables, once the values of others are known. These
procedures are often used for computing the values of variables at some future time,
given the values at a present or past time.19
In nearly all models it is found that the variables can be classified20 into four
categories [Ref. 9: p. 17].
1. Controllable or Decision Variables. These are variables whose values can be
determined by the decision process.
2. Uncontrollable Variables. These are variables that are not under the control of
the decision maker, but represent the "state of the world" as interpreted by the
model.
3. Result or Output V.ariables. These are variables characterizin~ the results of
processes in tliereal world and are usually defined by controllable variables.
4. Utility or Value Variables. The decision maker will set a utility or value on the
results of the process. The value is a function of controllable and uncontrollable
variables.
Uncontrollable variables are of two types: those whose values are computed in
the modeling process and those which are inputs to the model. The latter represent the
effect of the environment on the system. For the model to operate, it is necessary to
obtain estimates of the values of these input variables over the time span of interest.
With uncontrollable variables there are degrees of uncertainty. Sometimes the
estimates are so sufficiently accurate that we can assume that the variables take on
specific values. This leads to what is called deterministic models: the uncontrollable
variables are assumed to be determined. 'When this cannot hold, a most accurate model
'''ill be one that represents the variables as statistical quantities and takes the variations
from reality specifically into account. These are known as probabilistic or stochastic
models.
The utility or value variables are computed by a formula from the result
variables; the formula is called the objective function or measure of effectiveness. The
controllable variables that give the best available utility are said to be the optimum.
3. The quantified decision problem
In most cases the model builder assumes the decision problem to be of the
following nature [Ref. 9: p. 18]: Find the values of the controllable (decision) variables
which produce the best utility (value) as measured by the utility variable(s), given the
assumptions about the uncontrollable variables.
19Something to remember: constraints are obligatory, objectives are optional.
20This classification of variables is used in the powerful computer modelling
language GAMS. We will use GAMS later to model a typical military problem.
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All modeling processes allow us to compute present and future values of result
variables. Some models (and their associated computational processes) enable us to
determine the utility-optimizing values of the controllable variables. The latter is
knoV\'ll as optimization and, when considering situations over time, the former is called
prediction. [Ref. 9: p. ·19]
Once a model has been shown to be an accurate representation of the problem
situation,. it can be called a "simulation model" and then it becomes a powerful
experimental device. A valid simulation model enables us to measure the effects of
changes to the problem structure without modifying the real-world system being
modeled. Thus, simulation models are used to answer" What if.. " questions of
different types, like: (1) "yVhat if we set the decision variables at certain values?" and
(2) "What if an uncontrollable variable takes on a different value?"
The advantage of providing a quantitative basis to a decision maker is not that
it makes his decision easier, for in many cases it may actually make his choice more
difficult. The advantage is that he knows better what the consequences of his decision
will be [Ref. 10: p. 23].
However, to completely describe the decision problems, we should not
overlook their qualitative or "fuzzy" side, since it is a dimension that is too often
encountered in real life decision situations. Not all variables in decision-making can be
quantified; there are many "fuzzy" variables which impose further constraints upon the
human's abilities as a problem solver and as a decision maker. It is not our intention
to include qualitative variables in this study, but we feel that for the sake of
completeness and future stimulation they should only be mentioned.
4. Decision problems and fuzzy sets
It would be quite comfortable if we always had to deal with quantifiable
variables because there are established ways to handle them, especially with the help of
Operations Research and probability theory. However, real-life decision problems often
considered by high-level decision makers (and somehow· more so by the He
institutionals) involve a considerable number of qualitative variables. The description or
even the classification of such variables can be characterized by the term "fuzzy" and it
can be said that they have certain degrees of "memberships" that are measured on a
(0.0 - 1.0) possibility scale and they are manipulated by "membership functions". They
follow the rules of fuzzy sets, a new area of modem mathematics [Ref. 11: p. B138].
These variables and their membership functions are handled by the equally new fuzzy
44
set theory and they can follow what it is called·"possibility distributions", in contrast
with the probability distributions of probability theory.
In the decision process and problems, certain forms of imprecision or
vagueness occur that are intrinsic to the problem and for which the probability calculus
seems to be inadequate [Ref. 12: p. 4]. Bellman and Zadeh21 give a concise abstract
classification of these forms of imprecision in terms of"classes in which there is no
sharp transition from membership to non-membership" [Ref. 11: p. B141].
To many people today, it. looks quite obvious that fuzzy set theory and
probability theory should be viewed not as rivals, nor necessarily even as
complimentary, but rather as similar logical systems. They have a common core that is
adequate for many aspects ofdecision analysis and they differ in certain well-defined
features that may, or may not, be relevant in particular applications.
We feel that it could be beneficial for our purposes to try to provide the
institutional decision maker with the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative
bases, to make his primary decision easier; that is, to help him decide on the adoption
of computers. as assisting tools for possible better decision-making.
It has been long recognized that the four decision elements -the alternatives,.
the criteria, the· outcome confidence in terms of the criteria, and the preference- are
indeed varied with time and situations. This is especially true when the decisions are· of
great importance or of high stake and they are unfamiliar to the decision maker. The
variability ofthese four elements causes great "fuzziness" in our understanding of the
decision-making. To understand this variability and reduce the fuzziness we need a
broader comprehension ofhuman psychology and behavior than that contained in the
pure: mathematical· and structured description of decision-making.
Fuzzy set theory is attractive because it allows us to consider decision
situations that are describable only or mainly in qualitative, verbal terms. Further, a
rigorous calculus is provided, with which one can manipulate the resulting fuzzy sets.
However, we by all means, do not want to leave the reader with the impression that
fuzzy set formulations are always straightforward, even though fuzzy sets are
eventually manipulated using non-fuzzy operations [Ref. 13: p. 101]. Furthermore,
fuzzy set concepts and formulations could be seen as being high-context products;
21Now some 25 years after Zadeh's original call for a new mathematics, fuzzv set
theory has clearly become accepted in the literature and most authors do not feel the
need to explain or justify their use of the techniques involved. However, it has not
always been so, ana there was much early debate about the need for any alternatives
whatsoever to probability theory, which to some extent still continues in many areas.
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therefore, we have the feeling that the fuzzy set theory would be rather appealing to
the HC institutional decision makers, perhaps because the theory itself was introduced
and developed primarily by HC mathematicians and scientists.22
It is not our intention to elaborate on the usefulness or the expected results of
the application ofthe fuzzy set theory on decision making. "Ve only wish to make the
point that fuzzy sets appear to be very appropriate for handling and analyzing
qualitative variables, that is to say, for handing high-level "unstructured~: decisions}3
decisions in which the' computer can not, asyet,24 otTer significant assistance.
Although we believe that a forthcoming possibility/probability theory
combination "'ill greatly improve decision making in the future, for the purposes of this
thesis we will remain faithful to the traditional quantitative methods of modeling
decision-making.
5. The decision process steps
The decision process that has evolved; over the past few years IRef. 9: p. 26]
can be looked at as a model of the modeling process. It involves a series of interrelated
steps' or stages that can be viewed as the decision process adaptation of the scientific
method.
For most purposes, the steps required in solving a decision problem are:
1. Formulating the problem
2. Developing a mathematical model to represent the system under study
3. Deriving a solution from the model
4. Testing the model and the solution
5. Establishing controls over the solution
6. Putting the solution to work
These steps can be viewed as accomplishing the follo",ing: for any problem we
need to define the broad objectives and goals of the system; examine the (possibly new)
area we are working in; determine the alternative courses of action available to the
decision maker; develop some statement, verbal or othernise, of the problem to be
investigated; translate the problem into a suitable logical or mathematical model which
221t is worth mentioning the fact that by going through the existing literature on
fuzzy sets one can see that almost the mnety. percent comes from authors that
represent HC cultures, about fifteen percent ofwliicfi are Greek or of Greek origin.
23Later on we will have the chance to investigate these decisions in more detail.
24Software eneineers working in fields like artificial intelligence and expertsys~e1lls have. the faith that soon !lie computer will be able to assist in these types of
decIsIon-makmg.
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relates the variables of the problem by realistic constraints and a measure of
effectiveness; find a solution which optimizes the measure of effectiveness; compare the
model's solution against reality to determine ifwe have actually formulated and solved
the real-world problem we started with; determine when the real-world situation
changes and reflect such changes into the mathematical model; and, most important,
implement the solution into operation (not just filling out a report) and observe the
behavior of the. solution in a realistic setting. As our ability to develop precise
mathematical models of operational problems is not a highly developed science, we
must be sensitive to discrepancies in the solution and feedback to the model
refinements that will cause future solutions to be more realistic and accurate.
The mathematical model is central to this decision-making methodology -it
offers understanding of the process and the problem under investigation; it provides a
vehicle for the evaluation and comparison of alternative solutions; it enables us to
evaluate the effects of a change of one variable on all the others; and finally, it
provides us with a quantitative basis to sharpen and evaluate our intuition of the
process under investigation.
The role of the mathematical model in decision making can be summarized
diagrammatically in Figure 5.1.
In discussions on decision-making we usually come across a division of the
process into three phases, characterized by H.A. Simon [Ref. 14: p; 54] as "finding
occasions for making a decision; finding possible courses of action; and choosing
among courses of action". These phases may be used to describe the decision maker's
activities25 and they may be labeled as (1) intelligence, (2) design (or search) and (3)
choice [Ref. 15: p. 89].
Table 1 lists some general decision making operations usually associated with
intelligence, designing and choice [Ref. 16: p. 137].
It should be mentioned that an operation may be used in more than one
. ,
activity and that there is no prespecified ordering of the operations. The operations
may involve complicated decision aids, such as simulation models.
2SHowever, as a representation of managerial decision .processes this
classification is seriously incomplete, according to B.J. Loasbv who adcrs that a choice
is not effective without implementation. It is dangerous to assume, either that what has
been decided will be acnieved, or that what happens is what was intended. Partly
because implementation is so uncertain, but fundamentally. because decisions are made
in circumsfances and bv processes which are liable to lead to error, there is then
usually some kind of assessment of the success of the decision made.
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PROBLEM SOLUTION














Figure 5.1 The role of the mathematical model
B. DECISION MAKING \VITH COMPUTERS
1. Current computer capabilities and limitations
Processes of importance in any scientific field characteristically possess two
types of complexities: conceptual and arithmetic. Even after we have overcome
formidable conceptual obstacles in the construction of a mathematical model of a
particular process, we often find ourselves frustrated by an inability to use this model
to obtain the numerical results required for a definitive answer to a specific question.
In many cases v.re believe that we understand the logical nature of the basic
interactions. Yet, because of the very large number of interactions involved, we are
often unable to achieve some desired numerical conclusions to check hypotheses.
[Ref. 17: p. 8]
The digital computer has greatly altered this state of affairs. It possesses the
specific ability to perform vast amounts of arithmetic and, more generally, to perform
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Assign risks or values to alternatives
Choice
Generate: statistics on alternatives,
Stimulate results ofaltematives
Explain. alternatives'
Choose' among alternatives '
Explain', choice
many kinds of symboL manipulations and logic operations;' It is, therefore; an"
appropriate challenge at an appropriate'time to determine whether or not the computer
can be used, in conjuction with various guiding mathematical theories and knowledge
of a specific field, to study'decision-making techniques in particular situations;
However, there are two diITerent types of mental manipulations that are
performed inside the human brain [Ref. 18: p. 284J and are critical to human: decision
making: (a) the analytic and (b) the intuitive. (The analytic is performed inside the left
cerebral hemisphere and the intuitive inside the right hemisphere). From our earlier
discussion on the two different ways of thinking, among others, between the HC, p.
time, (and in extension institutional military) people and the LC, M-time (and in
extension occupational military) people, we can claim that the institutional is a more
intuitive thinker (and in extension decision maker) than the occupational, who tends to
be more of an analytic type of thinker and decision maker.
But computers are powerful tools only for certain kinds of tasks. Their
potential to support intuitive (right hemisphere) processing is just beginning to be
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explored and developed. Despite much talk about heuristic cognitive styles and
heuristic computer models, it is unlikely that intuition can be successfully modeled.
[Ref. 18: p. 286]
The point we want to make with this argument is that if the computer was
able to completely assist decision making, then it would be more of a realistic assistant
to the occupational than to the institutional military. Thus, we are better off focusing
on the different but complementary, roles which man and machine play in solving
managerial problems.26 Therefore; \ve should investigate how the computer can assist
in the analytic information processing.
Studies of specific decisions and general studies of decision making have
indicated the potential benefits of computer support for decision making. These
potential benefits can be divided [Ref. 16: p. 125] into two categories: displaced cost
and' added value.
Displaced cost results from reduced costs for data collecting and computation'
and data presentation in support of decision making. In these' mechanical tasks p the-
(dollar) value o[computer support is measurable.
Added value results from investigating more alternatives,. doing more
sophisticated analysis of alternatives,. using better methods of comparing alternatives,
making quicker decisions and so on. Often it. is difficult to identify the added value
because it does not occur on a routine basis, but it is generally accepted that small
improvements in decision making can result in high added value. For example, in 1972,
an airline's computer-supported decision to redeploy aircraft in only one route was
reported to have increased profit 5300,000 in one month [Ref. 16: p.. 126]. Such
potentiaL benefits continue to stimulate management's interest in computer support for
decision making [Ref. 19: p. 65].
Computer hardware and software vendors also have an interest in the
development of computer support for decision-making because such support can help
justify large data bases, data base management systems, additional computing power,
new programming languages, time sharing and terminals. Also, computer support for
26"Vhile computers cannot be intuitive, they can. support intuitive processes in
man if designed properly. Flexible interactive systems using natural written language,
natural sQeech, color, visual images, graphics and which even generate random
thoughts lor decision makers to contemPlate are better suited for complex tasks than
routine processing systems. Use of these design principles may successfully extend
human problem solvmg capabilitdv in complex organizatlOns like today's Navies. But
success will depend on now well esigners and deCIsion makers comprehend the nature
of tpe partnersnip' between man and machine. This is exactly what the Human Factors
engmeers are dedicated on.
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decision making can encourage the executives of the customer to take a personal
interest in computers and can help the computer salesperson encourage "management
involvement" in data processing.
The use of computers in decision making can be described in terms of various
types of decisions. Follo~ing R.N. Anthony [Ref. 20: p. IS}, decisions can be classified
as:
1. Strate.gic Planning: decisions related to setting policies, choosing objectives and
selectmg resources.
2. Manageme..nt Control: decisions related to assuring effectiveness in acquisition
and use of resources.
3. Oper,ational Control: decisions related to assuring effectiveness in performing
specIfic tasks.
4. Operational Performance: decisions that are made in performing the specific
tasks.
Simon [Ref. 21: p. 103] classifies decisions as structured (programmable) or
unstructured (nonprogrammable) depending on whether or not the decision making
process can be described in detail before making the decision. A decision may be
unstructured because of novelty, time constraints, lack of knowledge, large search
space, need for nonquantifiable data and so on. G.A. Gorry and M.S. Scott Morton
[Ref. 22: p. 55-70] combined Anthony's and Simon's categories as shown in Table 2 .
TABLE 2
"".j TYPES OF DECISIONS AND DEGREES OF DECISION STRUCTURE
Operational Operational ManalZement StratelZic
Performance Control Control Plannmg
Structured Payroll Accounts BudC7et Tanker
Production Receivable Analysis Fleet Mix
Airline Inventory Short Term _ Site
Reservations Control Forecasts Location
Dispatching Production Long Term Mergers
Scheduling Forecasts
Solving Cash Budget Product
,Unstructured a Crime Management Preparation Planning
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Gorry and Scott Morton claim that most existing computer support for
decision making is for structured decisions, that some progress has been made in
supporting semistructured decisions and that almost no computer support is used for
unstructured decisions.27 They argue that it is the semistructured and unstructured
decisions (especially management control and strategic planning) which are of the
greatest concern to decision makers. They call systems which are intented to support
these types of decisions Decision Support Systems (DSS). Thus, DSS are a subset of
Management Information Systems (MIS), since MIS include all systems which support
any management decision making. DSS can be divided into two general categories:
data-oriented systems and model-oriented systems. Data-oriented systems provide
functions for data retrieval, analysis and presentation. Both generalized and special
purpose software packages are included in this category. Systems in this category are
usually developed by persons with data processing or computer science backgrounds.
The model-oriented systems provide accounting, simulation or optimization models to
help make decisions. These systems usually are developed by persons with
management science and operations research backgrounds.
Because DSS have high potential value for both users and suppliers of
computer services, one would expect to find many DSS in use. Yet the literature on the
applications of computers in government and business indicate little explicit use of
DSS, despite their potential for displaced costs and added value. Therefore, many
things must be changed and corrected, at least when DSS come to assist a He
institutional military decision maker. In the next section we will suggest a procedure
which will, as we expect, make things easier and support our purposes.
2. The proposed procedure for a "transparent" system
There are many opinions on why data-oriented and model-oriented systems
have not had much success in supporting decision m~king. In general, the main
problem seems to be a mismatch between DSS design or performance and the
requirements of decision makers or decision-making. The causes of this mismatch may
be technical (for example, poor response times) or nontechnical (such as different
personal preferences). Because of the mismatch, many systems which are developed
cease to be used or are used for routine report generation rather than for direct support
of decision makers. Observations from studies of decision-making and decision makers
27Since then (1971), there are unstructured decisions that are supported, to a
certain degree, \vith spreadsheets, like cash management and budget preparation, even
by portabfe nucrocomputers.
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[Ref. 16: p. 151] indicated four major problems in the designs of existing DSS, which
put some limitations to their usefulness and operability:
1. Existing DSS do not provide the representations which decision makers need for
semistructured and unstructured decisions
2. Existing DSSusuallv support only one or two of the three basic activities(intelligence, design and choice) of decision-making
3. Existing DSS do not provide enoulrh support (and introduce additional
requirements) for conceptualization and memory, two areas where decision
makers are .observed to need help
4: Existinlr DSS require specification of the decision-making process in advance
and do':'not support a variety of stvles,.skills and knowledlre;thus they do. not
help decision makers exercise the personal control which they are accustomed
when making semistructured and unstructured decisions.
Instead, we feel that the computer (or DSS, if it is prefered) must:
1. only support the decision maker and not attempt to replace his judgment. It
should. not try to provide the "answer" nor impose a predefined sequence of
analysIs.
2. be designed in a way that· allows quick.. easy extentionsandalterations.
3. provide<anjnterface28 that effectively buffers the user from the computer~
4. allow the- interactive' dialolrue29 to be based on the specific. decision maker's
concepts,. vocabulary and definition of the decision situation.
5. provide communicative and context-sensitive display devices30 and output
generators.
The keywords toa better system; arej7exibility, easeandlriendlinessofuse;.
and adaptivity~ A decision maker, especially an institutionalmilitary one,. will not use a
systemlackingtheseattributes~ It is hard to see any reason why he should.. As far as· he'
is concerned, this interface is the system itself and the main issue in the design of a
successful decision support computer system should be how the system should appear to
the user; This' is not a difficult arrangement, since the same system may be' presented
in a variety of modes, even better with more than one mode combined to satisfy more
potentiaL users. The system could then be operated in programmer mode, expert mode,
novice mode or even natural query mode. In Appendix A we present the basic
differences between these possible modes. However, the selection of the appropriate
mode involves many tradeoffs between efficiency and software overhead costs.
28This interface should generally be tailored to the user. It is seen as critical to
overcoming the decision maker's fear or dislike of the computer and it must be stressed
that the system is what the user sees it to be.
29Str~tegic planning and policy analysis are problem areas where a dialogue is
rarely pOSSIble.
30The computer is "silent" when it comes to output or results display; it returns
nothing unless the 'Qrogranuner asks it to do so. So, it is up to the progranuner to
decide on the type oT die desired output and the contained information.
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Computer programmers and software developers are taught (and try their best) not to
waste CPU time. In this way, they often produce programs that cannot easily be
"enjoyed" by many and they can be totally discouraging for the novice. It is obvious
that in our case, this should be avoided at any cost for the sake of acceptance. At the
introductory stage, applications written for the institutional military decision maker
should be presented and run in the novice mode. It is important that the program, its
details, and the operating/updating procedures should be "transparent" to him, even if
he does not intend to. operate' or maintain the system by himself. He should be
required only to:'
1. express the problemas best as he can .
"2. provide the constraints known to him or set by himselC;'
3. make available all the existing experience and data that are or can be related to
the problem
4. express his specific initial questions
to a person in his staff, an "intermediary" as we will be calling- him from now on, who
knows the system's operation. Ideally, this person. can be the Information Systems
Officer (ISO) that we mentioned in Chapter IV, especially if he also happens to be an
operations researcher. Alternatively, the intermediary might be a systems analyst" an
operations researcher,. or the actualprogranuner who put the system or the application
together under the order of the decision maker. They could substitute- the ISO,
provided they have adequate" military training; otherwise, they can simply assist him.
The intermediary would be the one to have the knowledge and the responsibility of the
operation and maintainance of the system and the related _data bases, so that the
system will provide quick answers and responses to the "vVhat if..." questions asked by
the decision maker that \vill challenge its robustness.
The intermediary is an absolute necessity, not a luxury. This is because the
institutional decision maker will never do the work of the operator or attempt to find
his own solutions using the computer himself, even if he knew how to do it! But would
this mean that the intermediary would eventually become indispensable to the decision
maker and conversely too powerful? Or the decision maker will soon give-up the
computer assistance, feeling perhaps that he does not have the control he is
accustomed to have? The answer is yes and no; it all depends on the position that the
intermediary will hold in the decision-making circle. Our proposal is modest:
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It requires an act offaith by the top decision makers. The hardware and most
of the necessary software is assumed readily available and is currently used in the kinds
of tasks that we mentioned in the Introduction. There exist people in the Navy who
are capable and more than willing to play the role of the "intermediary". And then, two
absolutely important relationships rnust be established and Iirmly maintained:
1. The JJote11lial i11lermedimy must reco¥nize rhat supporting the decision process of
the Navy is the central issue, nor rhe aesign of computer systems.
2. The 'ioecision maker must define q.n.d eSlablish the intermediary as part of his own
plamlmg ream and /lot as a rechnzclan.
In Figure 5.2 we layout the basic proposed relationship between the decision
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Figure 5.2 The decision maker - intermediary cooperation
In the figure, each activity is designated as "OM", ''I'' or "OM,!" to indicate
that the particular task is the prime responsibility of the decision maker or the
intermediary, or is to be shared, In the upper left, the decision maker and the
intermediary work together to verbalize the model. Then the intermediary is given the
task of finding measures for the factors which have been enunciated. The entire process
is a series of feed-back loops, since the intermediary must return to the decision maker
for review and evaluation of his work at the completion of each of the tasks assigned
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primarily to him. In each loop, the decision maker and the intermediary also jointly
consider revisions of previous steps.
If the two agree on the model's general form and the measures to be used, the
intermediary proceeds to construct explicit predictive or optimization models which will
be appropriate for the situation. For instance, he may first develop regression
predictive models and then go on with linear or non-linear optimization models.
Then the decision maker decides and takes some action. He can challenge the
data, the intermediary or the system. The intermediary is often given the opportunity
to review and evaluate the results. Together, they then determine whether a complete
rerun of the process is necessary.
The model that is finally developed determines the information requirements
for this particular decision problem or area through its predictive variables, criteria,
solution and sensitivity information. The decision maker will then have better
understanding31 and adequate information to make his decision. The intermediary on
the other hand will keep all the useful functions and data that can be collected if the
problem was important or simply interesting, document the problem and its solution(s)
and make himself available for his next assignment.
The above proposed requirements and cooperation are likely to by established
and maintained without much difficulty, if we remember that both the decision maker
and the intermediary are HC institutional military.
There is, however, one quality that the intermediary should have. It is the
ability to be able to communicate with LC M-time technically oriented people, from
whom he is going to acquire the"know how". It is imperative that he is at least aware
of the facts and arguments that we mentioned so far in this study. The communication
with the LC occupational military must be as effective as possible. This, is the reason
that we_suggested earlier to the Admiral to make sure that the new specialty of naval
officer is established; the ISO will be his intermediary.32
In Figure 5.3 we layout the basic model of the proposed system, as it is
viewed by the decision maker.
31 Since a computer model can quickly evaluate many "runs" of a given plan and
anticip.ate the consequences of different sets of assumptions, the model helps cIarify the
feasibl1ity of the plan's objectives. If none of the plan's practical alternatives and valid
sets of assumptions lead to the desired goals, there may be a defect somewhere in the
established oDjectives.

















Figure5.3 The basic computer-transparent decision-making system
The whole system is transparent to the decision maker, beyond the
intermediary. The intermediary creates and runs the models on the computer. The
decision maker would not even have to be near the computer or the terminaL fiut if he'
decides to be there, he will have the very exciting benefit of having immediate33
interactive answers to his "\Vhat if..." questions, make "goal seeking" or be given results
from reverse calculations.
But let us take a more detailed look, into the model of the proposed
transparent system.
33When \ve say "inmlediate" we mean response times that range from few seconds
to few minutes~,depending on the required changes or additions. We characterize such
responses to "\v hat iL." questions as exciting, to say the least.
57
3. The transparent system model and its details
The concept behind the model in Figure 5.3 is very different from the DSS
approach. Here, there may be no single pre-written integrated DSS-type program. One
of the main roles of the intermediary is to build -very quickly- the needed system from
a general library of functions and data bases. If such building is" possible; "then' the
system can accommodate a: much wider range of user requests and needs. The user, i.e;,.
the decision maker,. is:required to' have very little' knowledge ofthe system's capabilities'
and certainly no knowledge of the system's routines; for him the intermediary is.. the
system.
Another major advantage of such a system is that it can be small enough to
run on a microcomputer. This means that the system can be installed or based almost
anywhere that it will be required or beneficial for it to be. Thus," it can be used equally
well on board ships, at small remote bases or at the private office of the top decision
makers. There is no need to say that it can also be as big and expanded as we want it
to be," depending on: the needs of the major flag commands. And one- can always
access a possible central maj or system from a terminal, using the right network.
There are four major subsystems34 and their sub-subsystems, as we can see
them in Figure 5;3:
1. the decision maker (block #1)
2. the intermediary \vith his assistant(s),: the decision models and the computer(blocks #2, 3,4,5,.6,7, 8 and 9)
3. the software support for the computer (blocks #10 and 11)
4. the decision"support data base(s) (block #12)
The starting point for putting the- system together will obviously be' to
generate the "primitive:' data bases (block #12) and functions (block #10), the library of
routines that form the basis for the system that the intermediary draws on, extends and
modifies. These functions can be for instance FORTRAN or APL library functions,
statistical packages, optimization packages etc.
The data base performs many functions tn the decision making support
system. First, it supports the development of models by providing the historical data
needed to develop the relationships between the variables and when analyzed help in
the estimation of the parameters and coefficients in the various equations. Second, the
data base integrates the three levels of models and allows data to be simultaneously
. 34The 9rude model has really only two major subsystems: the decision maker and
the tntermedlary.
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available to all levels of models. Third, the data base keeps the models up-to-date over
time. In this way the models respond to changes in the organization and the
environment. Fourth, the data base combines several data sources. These sources
include external data such as DoD, political, economical or industrial data (i.e., from
external agencies and the civil sector) and internal data (i.e., from the different Navy
departments).
The software thatwill be used for the development of the. programs, in block
#11, can be a package which could contain simple computing tools like an editor and a
word-processing package.
Finally, it is suggested that the three different types of decision models (blocks
#5, 6 and 7) are grouped and used separately for greater flexibility and faster operation.
The connection between blocks #8 (the terminal) and #9 (the computer) can be a
remote connection through some network, as we mentioned earlier. The same applies
also for the connection of block #9 (the computer) and blocks #10 (the functions
library) and #12 (the data base). The function of the rest of the blocks of the modeL in
Figure 5.3 are self-explanatory.
\Ve would like to make a final remark: As soon as the system is set up and in
working order, the intermediary or his assistants must provide for the system to be
operated in at least two modes; the novice mode, for the important reasons we have
already mentioned, and the mode that suits their skills. We feel that we should stress
again this serious factor because we believe it is critical to the acceptance and to the
success of the whole system.
In the next chapter we will attempt to present a few examples of the way that
a system like the one we just proposed can assist us to take some fast and hopefully
better decisions on some typical Naval decision problems.
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VI. COMPUTER.ASSISlliIt&~b~l5'lf~i tg~gME COMMON NAVAL
A. THE NAVAL PROBLEMS
There is an enormous variety of situations in the modem Navy that needs better
and faster answers. This is because the importance or the consequences of some naval
problems are considered to be critical, too costly or too risky. Therefore, judging by
the current and future state of the affairs in the Navy, our only hope to get better
answers probably lies in using Operations Research (OR) methods, so that at least we
have the feeling that our ability to find solutions does not only depend on experience
and intuition, but also on the proven rationale of the OR methods.
In this chapter we will attempt to give only a modest demonstration of how the
combination of OR methods and the computer can assist naval decision-making, by
finding answers to some typical naval problems. We assume that we have a transparent
system, like the one we suggested in the previous chapter, set and running for us by the
intermediary and his assistants. A data base exists and contains many kinds of data
internal to the Navy, as well as external data. In our functions library we can find
many useful functions and "off-the-shelf' packages, like FORTRAN and Linear and
DynamicPrograrnrning optimizers,modeling and statistical tools etc. The intermediary
(i.e., the system) is now ready to get his hands on some naval problems.
B. COMPUTER-ASSISTED OPERATIONS RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
Operations Research provides a number of methods and techniques that can be
appropriate for solving naval problems. For our purposes we chose to present and
demonstrate the solutions to three such problems, using OR methods and the
computer as an assistant to the modeling and solution procedures: (1) a problem
where we wish to optimize the desired utility, during the planning of a hypothetical
naval operation, (2) a problem where we need to simulate our defensive" tactical
planning, in order to see which preplanned course of action is likely to give better
results, assuming a random enemy appearance, and (3) a problem where we wish to
choose, after proper evaluation, the best weapon (judging from the respective
probability of kill) to be installed on a new aircraft.
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1. Optimization
As an example of an optimization situation we will use the following realistic
scenario.
The country is engaged in war since it was invaded by a potential enemy by
air, land and sea. The only way to force the enemy to withdraw his assaulting forces is
to inunediately answer back \\ithalL available weapons, in conjunction with continuing
the 'already successful resistance' to the'invasion~
The Navy is about to plan and execute its part ofthe retaliation attack on the
enemy. The- operations department believes that the best way to handle the situation is
to attempt a massive combined attack on most of the' enemy's important military
power sites and support installations in his own land, with the hope that, if successful,
such an action will have the desired impact on the enemy's morale and military power.
The decision maker of this "aggressive(' department wants to cause the maximum
possible damage to the enemy and he'is prepared to take necessary risks. However, .. the'
decision makers in the logistics and the technical support departments, being more risk
aversive and more conservative; argue that they would rather set a desired leveL of
damage and minimize the total expected cost of the operation.
"'vVe~ suggest that it is worth examining both strategies,. so that the final
decision maker is provided with. a more complete perspective; Here we have decided to'
demonstrate a solution to the'problem that supports the more conservative approach
for handling the crisis~ In this way; the objective of the' operation is to cause a desired
and prespecified minimum level of damage on the targets to be attacked, according to
their relative importance and the class in which they are categorized, by using the
available weapons for the attack (under several restrictions on both the availability and
the types of weapons). The decision maker wants to know which would be the best
allocation of the available weapons so that the desired minimum damage would be
achieved, keeping the total expected cost of the operation at the allowable minimum.35
There are many deterministic (i.e., well defined) and probabilistic/stochastic
(Le., uncertain) factors and constraints that should be considered in such large scale
operation and we cannot possibly include all of them in a single model for the purposes
of this thesis. However, an expanded and enriched model containing most of the
35Under such a defensive scenario, traditionally the institutional militarv is not
bound to set cost as a restriction. However, in our model we are minimizing the cost of
the operation either because we feel that the economic situation of the country should
not 15~ sevet:ely damaged, or .b~cause we just want to get an idea of what is this
operation gomg to cost, at a ffilmmum.
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the training level of the pilots available and the cost of their training
the probability of assigning different training level pilots on different aircraft
the allowed or desired ammunition load on the different platforms
the probability with which the different weapons are expected to survive their








desired aspects of such an operation may be constructed by the intennediary and his
team, and solved using the suggested system.
Following our model in Figure 5.3, the intennediary (blocks #2, 3 and 4)
collects all the necessary data (that he cannot readily draw out of his data base, i.e., in
block #12) and constructs a computer model (in block #5, 6 or 7) like the one that is
exhibited in Appendix B. From his functions library ( blocks #10 and 11) he selects and
uses the appropriate language; modeling and computing tools. As his main modeling
tool he chooses to use GAMS/MINOS; a very powerful' and exciting mathematical
modeling andlinearjnonlinear optimizer package36 and then he runs his application on
the computer system (block #8 and 9).
The input parameters of interest, on which sensitivity analysis can be applied
were chosen to be the following:
L time ofthe attack
2: weather conditions at the tan!ets' area and the probability with which they may
be expected, for. the time of tne year when the attack is taking place: • •
3. minimum;number of weapons of all types assigned. to the various. targets
4. minimum desired damage on the various targets
5. minimum desired weighted damage on the different classes of targets
6. initial cost ofthe'weapons to be used
7. the military value of each target
8" theprobabilitv that the various tamets will be damal!ed by one unit of the
different weapons, if they are hit by die'respective weapon
the weight of the various targets according to their respective class
upper and lower bounds on the number of the various weapons that can' be
used or preferred to be used
the cost of the: actual ammunition to be used
36GAMS (a general algebraic modeling System) was developed by the 'World
Bank in the Seventies and works fine witll 'MINOS (modular in-core nonlinear
optimization system) that was developed at the Department of Operations Research,
Stanford University. A major advantage of GAMS 1S that the programmer can use his
familiar mathemat1cal format to code the constraints and eSluations. Its disadvantage
though is that it is not yet interactive. The combined GAMS/MINOS optimizer
version for a microcomputer was used in this example; more details can be found in
Appendix B.
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As we mentioned earlier, the above are only a portion of the actual realistic
factors that must be taken into account. Only some basic costs are considered; human
losses are not considered.
The output of the model is designed to give the following information:
1. the availability and the suggested usage of the different weapons
2. how many weapons of each tvpe are needed to cause the desired minimum
damage and on \vhich target they should be allocated
3. the minimum cost ofthe operation
4. the expected damage value, so that it can be compared with. other methods of
solving the problem.
For an experienced intermediary or progranuner, the entire modelling and
solving process is estimated to take a few hours, and the actual processing of the model
and the generation of the answers by a typical microcomputer actually takes about
three minutes and only seconds by a mainframe. It does not take much additional time
to run a sensitivity analysis. \Ve did not attempt to solve the same problem manually,
but we expect that it would take much longer, and doing sensitivity analysis would
certainly take a vast amount of time.
The only information that the institutional decision maker really wants to see
are the results contained in the output, but he can see much more if he has the time or
the desire; We leave it up to him to look in Appendix B for the complete optimization
process and the computer model and its documentation.
The report, however, an intermediary would typically return to the decision
maker would look like the one in Table 3. The weapons used are short range ballistic
missiles (SRBM), two types of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMI and MRBM2)
and two types of long range bombers (B 1 and F-111). \Ve required the minimum use of
four new BI bombers in order to collect useful real-battle data on the behavior of the
involved crew and equipment for further analysis and evaluation.
2. The benefits of computer simulation
In several places earlier we briefly mentioned simulation. Here we will explain
in a simple fashion what simulation is and how we could use it to help us attack some
Navy problems.
Simulation is a strategy that is generally used for generation and manipulation
of data or the repetitive cycling of a model when environmental or setting factors
preclude normal methods. These factors include limitations like time, money, personnel



































of operation is approx. $2.6 billion
Achieved DAMAGE VALUE is 1559
cannot be done on a small scale -for example an atomic bomb either has a critical mass
or it does not, and one cannot do small scale experiments in this area.37
37This exam"Rle was given by Professor R. W. Hamming in one of his lectures on
simulation at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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This strategy is based on the mathematical manipulation of complex models
which places the decision maker in a controlled "real life" situation, using simulation
computer programs. Most programs of this type allow the user to input a series of
parameters and then process them in a compressed fashion through the model. The
resultant information is displayed for user perusaland may include pertinent comments
and outline significant data. In general, there is no predefined learning "path". Instead,
the decision maker is. allowed' to .learn .through actual manipulation. of these processess.
These types ofprograms are frequently used in statistical analysis and can also be very
effective learning tools for the decision maker. We find that concepts, lessons learned
and decisions taken via computer simulations are likely to be retained by the decision
maker longer.
The word simulation seems to imply fancy things, but in fact we have been
doing simulations all our life without thinking about them. Whenever we' are making
any" size~' ofdecision in'our mind we are doing a simulation by imagining what might
happen before" deciding on a course of action. What is new is the ability of a. computer
to carry out vastly more elaborate simulations,. especially in more technicaL areas and
when, as we mentioned earlier, situations are changing rapidly.
A computer which is running simulation programs is to a great extent the
laboratory of the past, where we tried out ideas before putting them into practice.. The'
pace of modern development, however, is such that we also do not have the time to
carry out a long sequence of laboratory experiments, each slightly larger or different
than the previous one. vVe must get to full scale practice rapidly, or else be outclassed
by others, inclUding a possible enemy. Andthis is something that matters a great deal
in the military and political situations.
Thus, simulation is an increasingly necessary tool. It is fortunate that
computers are now available to help us model reality and in so far as the model is
accurate we will get the corresponding outcomes of the experiments.
It is found [Ref. 23: p. 6] that some of the most prevalent and important





5. training and education
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To get a feeling of computer simulation, in the rest of this chapter we will
present two examples of how simulation and simulation results can be used by the
intermediary in order to assist the decision maker.
Q. A detection problem
Our first example on the use of simulation fits in the following scenario.
The Navy wishes to monitor all traffic through a certain navigation channel. All
surface ships transiting that channel must be be detected, if possible::. Submarines
cannot use this channel because it is neither deep nor safe enough. To achieve such
close monitoring, it is. decided that detecting sonobuoys should be placed at certain
positions. Enemy ships can transit the area by approaching from any direction; There
is only one type of sonobuoy available at the moment and only a limited number of
them can be used in this operation.
The decision maker wants to know which should be the "best" positioning
of his sonobuoys, so that he can have the highest probability of detecting the transiting
enemy ships, since Air Force support is limited and only on· request.
The input parameters that are considered as input to his problem, given the'
above constraints, are the following:
1. the number ofthe sonobuoysavailable
2. the coordinates of the sonobuoys
3: the characteristics ofthe available type ofsonobuoys
4. the assuz:ned bivariate normal distribution of the independently appearing
enemy ships
5. the "randomness" of the above appearance
6. the size of the navigation channel
The· intermediary decides to write a computer program in FORTRAN, to
simulate the detection process of one thousand random appearing "targets". To create
bivariate' random coordinates for the 1000 targets he uses a library function that
generates standard normal random variables and he tries different sonobuoys
arrangements within the given detection-possible area.
The output is designed to provide the probability of detection of the
targets, for any given arrangement of the available sonobuoys. The intermediary may
try as many arrangements as he thinks is satisfactory, probably including the one that
the decision maker would have used trusting his experience and intuition. Finally, the
arrangement that gives the highest detection probability is suggested to the decision
maker.
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In Appendix C, besides the simulation solution, we also computed the
probability of detection for the given in Appendix C sonobuoy arrangement, so that
the reader can compare (the based on) Detection Theory analytical estimations to the
one given by the computer simulation. This time, it does not take very long to compute
the probability of detection manually, for one arrangement and one random target,
using the "confetti approximations".38 However, trying many arrangements and many
targets it is another matter. The simulation program, though, can offer what could be
the best arrangement to the decision maker in a matter of minutes. The intermediary
would return to the decision maker a solution report that would contain the following
information:
Admiral, the probability that we will detect a random enemy ship, given this
sue:e:ested pattern\ is .664. However. we can try to find a better .Qattern because
theoretically.the "Ideal", probability for our 16 sonobuoys is .915. We can find the
best pattern m a few mmutes..-..
b. 'Weapons evaluation
Finally, in this second example we can see how simulation results can be
used. The scenario is as follows:
Three 20mm and three 30mm cannons are being considered for use in the
F-14 aircraft. The cannons have different characteristics such as: accuracy, weight, rate
of fire, lethality per round etc., etc. The cannons are being evaluated by the Navy using
a manned simulator which records data for 10 pilots engaging in simulated air-to-air






probability. of obt?liniqg .firing position during the engagement PA (function of
cannon weIght, SkIll of pIlot, etc.)
average number of rounds fired per engagement for each cannon N (function of
cannon rate of fire, etc.)
probability of hitting threat aircraft per round, for each cannon PH (function of
cannon accuracy, muzzle velocity, weight, pilot skill, etc.)
probability of kill given a hit (for each round), expressed in terms of vulnerable
area (Avr divided by_ average exposed area of threat aircraft durin~ engagement(A)., i.e., PKH = AVIA (function of explosive charge per round, fragmentation,
etc.)
38As these ap.proximations were presented in the lectures of Professor J. N.
Eagle, at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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The decision maker wants to choose one of the above six gun systems and
he thinks that it would be reasonable to base his choice on the best "probability of kill"
and the minimum number of rounds needed to achieve an acceptable probability of
kill, say 65 percent.
The problem then is (a) to calculate the probability of a kill per
engagement, for each cannon system and (b) to find the number ofrounds one needs
to fire to achieve a 0.65 kill probability, for each gun system.
The results of the mentioned simulation, that is A, AV, PA, PH and N, are
stored in the data base of the intermediary's system (block #12 in Figure 5.3) and are
used by a simple FORTRAN program, as it appears in Appendix D, written by him or
his progranuners for this purpose. A couple of hours after he was given the assignment,
he returns to the decision maker with the following results, taken from his program's
output, that will help him make a rational and objective decision:
RES U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 1
=================================================






PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.600
NOTE: PK <.650
FOR PK >.650, 36 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
RES U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 2
================================================







--------------PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.738
--------------FOR PK >.650, 14 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
RES U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 3
------------------------------------------------








PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.666
--------------FOR PK >.650, 27 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
RES U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEI1 NO. 4
================================================







PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.631
NOTE: PK <.650
FOR PK >.650, 11 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
RcES,UL T S FOR GUN> SYSTEM NO.5
================================================







PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0 ..771
..._-----------
FORPK >.650, 10 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
R, E S U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 6
================================================






PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.830
--------------FOR PK >.650, 7 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
From the above results it is expected that the decision maker will consider
the procurement of either system #5 or system #6, provided that cost considerations or
other factors still support this choice.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this thesis we admitted the fact that the Greek Navy, like most other
institutional military establishments, will not readily accept or implement the use of
computers in the area of decision making. In our effort to try to change this attitude
and.per.suade~ the Greek. Navy: decision maker £0 at lease consider the' possibility oC
granting more trust to computers,we conducted an in-depth research. to find a rational,
reason behind his attitude. Operations Research not only provided. us with. the~
methodology to carry out this research but gave us also the appropriate techniques to
attempt a what we believe it is proper (for our case) diffusion of the use of the·
computer in the decision;.making activities.
The following conclusions can be expressed as results of our research:
1. the fact that the institutional military does not accept technolol!icar innovations
in fields like decision making is a function of his own ~nature, culture;.
idiosyncrasies and established norms
2~ that the communication between high context Qolvchronic and low context
monochronic people is diHicult and meflicient. if consideration of their basic
cultural differences is not taken into account. This is likely to be most evident
in. the area ofhigh technology and computers
3~ that computers are and will continue· to be increasinglv able to assist the
decision maker in his diflicult and controversial tasks, provided that they are·
used as tools and not as magic decision making machines "
4. that the institutional militarY and in particular the Greek Navv decision makers
will have a lot to benefit from the wIder use of co.mputers, no"t to mention that
very soon they will not be able to do much without them
5. that the diffusion of a technological innovation like the· use of computers as
valuable tools in the decision-makinl! process must be done with great care,so
that it will not be rejected by the institutional military.
As a result of the above" conclusions we are suggesting a diffusion model,. which
we believe may succeed in. changing the Greek Navy decision maker's attitude.
According to our model, we recommend the high priority establishment of a new
specialty of staff oflicer, the Information Systems Oflicer (ISO), who would be the
necessary interfacing link between the computer and the naval society. His primary
jobs will be (a) the firm establishment and the smooth continuity of the various major
or minor computer systems in the Navy, (b) to provide the much needed interface and
to buffer the communication channels between the occupational and his fellow
institutional counterparts and (c) play the role of the "intermediary" between the
decision makers and the "transparent" decision-assisting computer system, of which
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again we recommend the high priority installation. The ISO will have to be a person
with firm grasp of computer technology and the charisma of intercultural
communication.
We do not recommend the use of one of the existing Decision Support Systems
(DSS), which are likely to do a better job for the occupational military or business
decision makers. They are neither very well established nor novice-friendly enough for
the Greek Naval decision maker,< even in their "friendliest" mode. It is our belieLthat
what is proposed in this thesis is what it is needed right now: an off-the-self "put-
together", transparent and flexible system which can be installed almost anywhere
quickly, easily and without too much money and prolonged "teething" problems under
"high-calibre" expertise and patronage. Furthermore, it is going to be more than
enough for helping the Greek Naval decision makers to realize that the computer is a
very valuable and fast tool, not only for supporting their inventory, decorating the
Naval War College or driving F-16s, but also for most of their decision making
situations and general or specific problem-solving. The computer is only going to
support and enhance their always invaluable experience and intuition, not replace
them. We hope that the few examples given in this thesis will contribute in this




The examples in this Appendix present four different interface modes, as it was
suggested in Chapter V. Each one utilizes a linear programming algorithm (the same
for each case) which requires user specification of such parameters like selling price and
estimated sales. The program itself retrieves production and cost data from a
permanent set of data bases. (The user inputs in each session are italicized).






(output file will be on unit 2)
(input data)




(stores lpz in permanent form)
(runs the program in "deblJg" mode,
allows the prolZrammer to mterrupt
execution and access machine level)
Programmer mode is obviously not for the inexperienced user. In Table 5 we see
how an expert mode would look like. Dialogues in this style are only limited by the
ingenuity of the system designer. They are highly general and must be tailored to the















(asks if the user wishes to





help (asks user which report he wishes to
have.printed out; user replies by
asking for list ofoptions)
reports available SOLN-summary ofLP'solution'
COST-summary of cost data
SENSY-sensitivity analysis of solution
reports?
SoLN COST
It can be noticed that the novice mode is polite, long-winded and structures the-
user's dialogue. It tries to minimize the skills and knowledge needed to run the system
and generally includes routines to check for errors and to advise or prompt the user.
Finally, in Table 7 we see how a natural query mode might look like, judging





please enter input. data
selling price.(S)?
23.50
estimate: sales at this price (in units) ?
500,000
desired inventory safety stock (in units) ?
200,000
input data complete; vou may double-check input figures NOW,.
type "yes" if dataare''OK,. type "no" if data are not correct
is input price' 23.50 OK?
yes
is input sales 500,000 OK?
yes'
is input safety stock. 200,000 OK?
yes
LPxxx is now running; please wait...
execution completed.
do'you "vish to see the solution in detail? type. "yes" or"'no"
no
reports available are: COS.T summarizes CO$( c.oefficient~ and totals
SENSY performs senSItIvIty analysIs
type the name of the report(s) you would like




Solve the LPxxx, with Marketing Department's
best estimates for next year.
See. how ~ensitive the output is to chanl5esindemand.
I wlllrevlew and plan what else to lOOK at.
75
APPENDIX B
A WEAPONS ALLOCATION PROBLEM
??GAMS 2.02 PC AT/XT 87/03/08 23:31:07 PAGE 1
















LCDR Harry Athanasopoulos HN ( NPS, March 1987)
IBM Personal Computer XT, 640K RAM, Intel 8087, 20 MB HD
KEDIT version 3.51 editor
GAMS/MINOS version 5.0 optimization package
The GAMS program can be found in pages 1 through 6 of
this output ~isting. The results that should be shown to
the decision maker can be found in the last two pages of
this listing (pages 23 and 24). The rest of the listing
is only useful to the intermediary, for sensitivity etc.
Key to input variables
SRGM . Short range ballistic missiles
MRBM1 Hedium range' ballistic missiles of type one-MRBM2 _11- _"- _"- _"- _11_ two
B1 New type of long range bomber
FIll Long range bomber
SILOS Enemy ballistic missile sites
SPARES -"- spare parts depos
POWPLANT -"- power plants
CRUISE Cruise-type missiles
BOMB 1000 lb bombs
ASM Air-to-surface missiles
ABOMB Nuclear bomb
EXPERT Pilots with expert training level
INTERM -"- _"- intermediate training level
".,
**********************************************************************






55 SETS I weapons to be allocated / SRBM,MRBM1,B1,F111,MRBM2 /
56 J targets to be attacked / T1 * T20 /
57 K target classes / SILOS,SHIPYRDS,AIRPORTS,SPARES,POWPLANT /
??GAMS 2.02 PC AT/XT 87/03/08 23:31:07 PAGE 2
NONLINEAR COST MINIMIZATION FOR WEAPONS VS TARGET ALLOCATION
L types of aircraft load
P p~lot level of training


























unit cost of weapon i in dollars
expected damage to target j













































































































108 PARAMETER MV(J) military value of target j
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P2rob. target j is UNDAMAGED by ONE unit of weapon i
T T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10
77
132 SRBM 1.00 .95 1.00 1.00 1.00 .85 .90 .85 .80 1.00
133 MRBM1 .84 .83 .85 .84 .85 .81 .81 .82 .80 .86
134 B1 .96 .95 .96 .96 .96 .90 .92 .91 .92 .95
135 Flll 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .96
136 MRBM2 .92 .94 .92 .95 .95 .98 .98 1.00 1.00 .90
137
138 +Tll T12 T13 T14 TIS T16 T17 T18 T19 T20
139 SRBM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .95 1.00 1.00
140 MRBM1 1.00 .98 1.00 .88 ~87 .88 .85 .84 .85 .85
141 Bl .99 .98 .99 .98 .97 .98 .95 .92 .93 .92
142 Fll1 .91 .92 .91 .92 .98 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
143 MRBM2 .,95 .96 .91 .,98 .,99 .99 1.00 1 ..00 1.00 1.00
144
145 TABLE U(J,K) wei~ht of. tar~et j with respect to' class k targets
146 SILOS SH PYRDS AI PORTS SPARES POWPLANT
147 TI 90 a a 0 0
148 T2 85 0 a 0 0
149 T3 85 a a 0 a
150 T4 95 0 0 0 0
151 T5 82 0 0 0 0
152 T6 0 90 0 0 0
153 T7 0 88 0 0 0
154 T8 0 87 0 0 0
155 T9 0 80 0 0 0
156 TI0 0 a 92 0 0
1ST Til 0 a 87 0 0
158 Tl2 0 0 91 0 0'
159 T13 0 a 0 79 0
160 T14~ a a 0 9S 0
161 TIS a 0 0 95 a
162 T16 0 0 0 0 92
163 T17 0 a 0 0 78
164 TI8 0 0 a 0 79
165 T19 0 0 0 a 85
166 T20 a a 0 a 95
167
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PARAMETER LOWER(I) lower limit of weapon i usage










PL(I,L) loading of 1 on carrier (weapon) i
CRUISE BOMB ASM ABOMB
o 0 0 0
o 0 0 0
6 40 0 1
o 10 4 0





























SPROB(p,r,W) prob. that weapon i will not survive mission
DAYGOOD DAYBAD NITEGOOD NITEBAD
EXPERT.SRBM LO LO LO 1.0
EXPERT.MRBMI La LO LO La
EXPERT.Bl .03 .05 .05 .07
EXPERT.F111 .04 .06 .06 .08
EXPERT.MRBM2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
INTERM.SRBM 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
INTERM.MRBMl 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
INTERM.Bl .07 .09 .09 .11
INTERM. F111 .09 .11 .11 .14
INTERM.MRBM2 La 1. a L a To a
TABLE
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PARAMETER TC(I) total cost of weapons ;
TC(I) = (OC(I)+SUM(P ,PPROB(P )*pc(I ,P»
k SUM«P,W),PPROB(P) * WPROB(W) * SPROB(P,I,W»
+ SUM(L,LC(L) * PL(I,L»)
VARIABLES
X(I,J) the number of weapons i to be assigned to target j
DAM damage value
COST cost to be minimized;
POSITIVE VARIABLE X;
EQUATIONS
OBJECTIVE objective function definition
EXPDAM(J) restriction on minimum expected target j damage
MINFIRE(J) minimum number of all weapons used on target J
CLASSDAM(K) lower bound of expected damage on target class k
MAXDEF(I) upper bound of # of weapon i used on targets j
MINDEF(I) lower bound of # of weapon i used on targets J
DAMAGEDEF damage definition ;
EXPDAM(J) .• I-PROD(I,ALPHA(I,J)**X(I,J» =G= D(J);
MINFIRE(J) •• SUM(I,X(I,J» =G= B(J) ;
CLASSDAM(K) •• SUM(J,U{J,K)*(l-PROD(I,ALPHA(I,J)**X(I,J»» =G=
CLASSWGT(K);
OBJECTIVE •. COST =E= SUM(I,TC(I)*SUM~J~X(I,J»);MAXDEF(I) .• SUM(J,X(I,J) =L= LIMIT I ;
MINDEF(I) •• SUM(J,X(I,J» =G= LOWER I ;


















SOLVE WAR USING NLP MINIMIZING COST
OPTION DECIMALS = 0 ~
* Create and display parameters for output interpretation:
PARAMETER REPORT (J,I) suggested usage of weapon i on target j ~
PARAMETER REPORT2(I,*) weapons restrlctions and desired usage i
PARAMETER REPORT3 total min expected cost i
REPORT(J,I) = X.L(I,J~ iREPORT2~I, IMINI) = LOWER(I i
REPORT2 I, 'MAXI) = LIMIT(I ;
REPORT2 I, 'USED') = SUM(J,X.L(I,J»
REPORT3 = COST.L i
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286 DISPLAY REPORT i
287 DISPLAY REPORT2 i
288 DISPLAY REPORT3 i
289 DISPLAY DAM.L
51 **********************************************************************
52 * End GAMS program - Beain Output :
53 ***********~**~*******************~***********************************
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SYMBOL LISTING
SYMBOL TYPE REFERENCES
ALPHA PARAH DECLARED 130 DEFINED 130 REF 250
252 257
B PARAM DECLARED 70 DEFINED 71 REF 251
CLASSDAM EQU DECLARED 245 DEFINED 252 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
CLASSWGT PARAM DECLARED 63 DEFINED 64 REF 253
COST V'AR DECLARED 238 IMPL-ASN 261 REF 254
261 274
D PARAM DECLARED 86 DEFINED 87 REF 250
DAM V'AR DECLARED 237 IMPL-ASN 261 REF 257
289
DAMAGE1 PARAH DECLARED 232 DEFINED 232 REF 277
DAMAGE2 PARAM DECLARED 233 DEFINED 233 REF 278
DAMAGEDEF EQU DECLARED 248 DEFINED 257 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
EXPDAM EQU DECLARED 243 DEFINED 250 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
I SET DECLARED 55 DEFINED 55 REF 2*228
229 230 2*250 251 2*252 2*254
2*255 2*256 2*257 270 271 272
273 CONTROL 228 250 251 252
254 255 256 257 270 271
272 273
J SET DECLARED 56 DEFINED 56 REF 3*250
2*251 3*252 254 255 256 3*257
270 273 CONTROL 250 251 252
80
254 255 256 257 270 273
K SET DECLARED 253 57 DEFINED 57 REF 252CONTROL 252
L SET DECLARED 58 DEFINED 58 REF 2*230
CONTROL 230
LC PARAM DECLARED 182 DEFINED 183 REF 230
LIMIT PARAM DECLARED 168 DEFINED 169 REF 255
272
LOWER PARAM DECLARED 175 DEFINED 176 REF 256
271
MAXDEF EQU DECLARED 246 DEFINED 255 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
MINDEF EQU DECLARED 247 DEFINED 256 IMPL-ASN 261
REF· 259
MINFIRE EQU DECLARED 244 DEFINED 251 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
MV PARAH DECLARED 108 DEFINED 109 REF 257
OBJECTIVE EQU DECLARED 242 DEFINED 254 IMPL-ASN 261
REF 259
OC PARAM DECLARED 79 DEFINED 80 REF 228
P SET DECLARED 59 DEFINED 59 REF 2*228
2*229 CONTROL 228 229
PC PARAM DECLARED 196 DEFINED 196 REF 228
PL PARAM DECLARED 188 DEFINED 188' REF 230
PPROB PARAM DECLARED 223 DEFINED· 224 REF 228
229
REPORT PARAH DECLARED 267 ASSIGNED 270 REF 286
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SYMBOL LISTING
SYMBOL TYPE REFERENCES
REPORT2 PARAM DECLARED 268 ASSIGNED 271 272 273
REF 287
REPORT3 PARAM DECLARED 269 ASSIGNED 274 REF 288
SPROB PARAM DECLARED 210 DEFINED 210 REF 229
TC PARAH DECLARED 227 ASSIGNED 228 REF 254
U PARAH DECLARED 145 DEFINED 145 REF 252
W SET DECLARED 60 DEFINED 60 REF 2*229
CONTROL 229
WAR MODEL DECLARED 259 DEFINED 259 REF 261
WPROB PARAH DECLARED 204 DEFINED 205 REF 229
X VAR DECLARED 236 IMPL-ASN 261 REF 239
250 251 252 254 255 256
257 270 273
SETS
I WEAPONS TO BE ALLOCATED
J TARGETS TO BE ATTACKED
K TARGET CLASSES
L TYPES OF AIRCRAFT LOAD
P PILOT LEVEL OF TRAINING
W TIME AND WEATHER CONDITIONS
PARAMETERS
..
ALPHA PROB. TARGET J IS UNDAMAGED BY ONE UNIT OF WEAPON I
B MIN. # OF WEAPONS OF ALL TYPES ASSIGNED TO TARGETS J
CLASSWGT MIN. EXP. WEIGHTED DAHAGE TO CLASS K TARGETS
D MINIMUM EXPECTED DAMAGE TO TARGET J (PERCENT)
LC COST OF AIRCRAFT LOAD IN DOLLARS
LIMIT UPPER LIMIT OF WEAPON I USAGE














MILITARY VALUE OF TARGET J
ORIGINAL UNIT COST OF WEAPON I IN DOLLARS
TRAINING COST OF PILOT ON WEAPON I
LOADING OF L ON CARRIER (WEAPON) I
PROBABILITY OF PILOT P ONBOARD WEAPON W
SUGGESTED USAGE OF WEAPON I ON TARGET J
WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS AND DESIRED USAGE
TOTAL MIN EXPECTED COST
PROB. THAT WEAPON I WILL NOT SURVIVE MISSION
TOTAL COST OF WEAPONS
WEIGHT OF TARGET J WITH RESPECT TO CLASS K TARGETS
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF W
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COST TO BE MINIMIZED
DAMAGE VALUE
THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS I TO BE ASSIGNED TO TARGET J
LOWER BOUND OF EXPECTED DAMAGE ON TARGET. CLASS· K
DAt1AGE DEFINITION
RESTRICTIONiONMINIMUMEXPECTED TARGET J DAMAGE
UPPER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
LOWER BOUND OF :1* OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
MINIMUM NUMBER OF ALL WEAPONS USED ON TARGET J
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION DEFINITION
COMPILATION TIME = 0.611 MINUTES
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EQUATION LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
---- OBJECTIVE =E= OBJECTIVE FUNCTION DEFINITION
OBJECTIVE •. - 200000*X(SRBM,Tl) - 200000*X(SRBM,T2) - 200000*X(SRBM,T3)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T4) - 200000*X(SRBM,T5) - 200000*X(SRBM,T6)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T7) - 200000*X(SRBM,T8) - 200000*X{SRBM,T9)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T10) - 200000*X(SRBM,Tll) - 200000*X(SRBM,T12)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T13) - 200000*X(SRBM,T14) - 200000*X(SRBM,T1S)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T16) - 200000*X(SRBM,T17) - 200000*X(SRBM,T18)
- 200000*X(SRBM,T19) - 200000*X(SRBM,T20) - 300000*X(MRBM1,Tl)
- 300000*X(MRBM1,T2) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T3) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T4)
- 300000*X(MRBM1,TS) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T6) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T7)
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- 300000*X(MRBM1,TS) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T9) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T10)
- 300000*X(MRBMl,Tll) - 300000*X(MRBMl,T12) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T13)
- 300000*X(MRBMl,T14) - 300000*X(MRBM1,TlS) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T16)
- 300000*X(MRBMl,T17) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T1S) - 300000*X(MRBM1,T19)
- 300000*X(MRBM1,T20) - 3.S061E+7*X(B1,T1) - 3.S061E+7*X(B1,T2)
- 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T3) - 3.S061E+7*X(B1,T4) - 3.S061E+7*X(B1,TS)
- 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T6) - 3.8061E+7*X(B1,T7} - 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T8)
- 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T9) - 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,TlO) - 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,Tll)
- 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T12) - 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T13) - 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T14)
- 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,TlS) - 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T16) - 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T17)
- 3.8061E+7*X(Bl,T18) - 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T19) - 3.S061E+7*X(Bl,T20)
- 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,Tl) - 2.S808E+7*X(F111,T2) - 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,T3)
- 2.S808E+7*X(F111,T4) - 2.S80SE+7*X(F111,TS) - 2.5808E+7*X(Flll,T6)
- 2.SS08E+7*X(Flll,T7) - 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,T8) - 2.S808E+7*X(F1ll,T9)
- 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,TlO) - 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,Tll) - 2.5808E+7*X{F111,T12)
- 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,T13) - 2.S808E+7*X(Fl11,T14) - 2.S80SE+7*X(Fll1,T1S)
- 2.S808E+7*X(F111,T16) - 2.SS08E+7*X(Fl11,T17) - 2.S808E+7*X(Fl11,T18)
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EQUATION, LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
OBJECTIVE =E= OBJECTIVE FUNCTION DEFINITION
- 2.SS08E+7*X(F111,T19) - 2.S808E+7*X(Flll,T20) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,Tl)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T2) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T3) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T4)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,TS) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T6) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T7)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T8) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T9) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T10)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,Tll) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T12) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T13)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T14) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T1S) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T16)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T17) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T18) - SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T19)
- SOOOOO*X(MRBM2,T20) + COST =E= 0 ; (LHS = 0)
EXPDAM(Tl).. (O.1744)*X(MRBM1,Tl) + (O.0408)*X(Bl,T1) + (O.0834)*X(MRBM2,Tl)
=G= -0.2 ; (LHS =-1 ***)
...
EXPDAM =G= RESTRICTION ON MINIMUM EXPECTED TARGET J DAMAGE
EXPDAM(T2).. (0.0513)*X(SRBM,T2) + (O.1863)*X(MRBMl,T2) + (0.OS13)*X(Bl,T2)
83
+ (0.0619)*X{MRBM2,T2) =G= -0.25 ; (LHS = -1 ***)
EXPDAM(T3).. (0.1625)*X{MRBM1,T3) + (0.0408)*X{B1,T3) + (O.0834)*X(MRBM2,T3)
=G= -0.25 ; (LHS = -1 ***)
REMAINING 17 ENTRIES SKIPPED
---- MINFIRE =G= MINIMUM NUMBER OF ALL WEAPONS USED ON TARGET J
MINFIRE(Tl)_. X(SRBM~Tl) + X(MRBMl,Tl) + X(Bl,Tl) + X(Flll,Tl) + X(MRBM2,Tl)
=G= 5 ; (LHS = 0 ***)
MINFIRE(T2) •• X{SRBM,T2) + X(MRBM1,T2) + X(B1,T2) + X(F1ll,T2) + X(MRBM2,T2)
=G= 0 ; (LHS = 0)
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EQUATION LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
MINFIRE =G= MINIMUM NUMBER OF ALL WEAPONS USED ON TARGET J
MINFIRE(T3) •. X(SRBM,T3) + X(MRBM1,T3) + X(B1,T3) + X(F1l1,T3) + X(MRBM2,T3)
=G= 0 ; (LHS = 0)
REMAINING 17 ENTRIES SKIPPED
---- CLASSDAM =G= LOWER BOUND OF EXPECTED DAMAGE ON TARGET CLASS K
CLASSDAM(SILOS).. (4.3599)*X(SRBM,T2) + (15.6918)*X(MRBM1,T1)
+ (15.838)*X(MRBM1,T2) + (13.8l41)*X(MRBM1,T3) + (16.5636)*X(MRBMl,T4)
+ (13.3266)*X(MRBM1,T5) + (3.674)*X(B1,T1) + (4.3599)*X(B1,T2)
+ (3.4699)*X(Bl,T3) + (3.8781)*X(Bl,T4) + (3.3474)*X(Bl,TS)
+ (7.5043)*X(MRBM2,Tl) + (5.2594)*X(MRBM2,T2) + (7.0874)*X(MRBM2,T3)
+ (4.8729)*X(MRBM2,T4) + (4.2061)*X(MRBM2,TS) =G= -352 ;
(LHS = -437 ***)
CLASSDAM(SHIPYRDS).. (14.6267)*X{SRBM,T6) + (9.2717)*X(SRBM,T7)
+ (14.1391)*X(SRBM,T8) + (17.8S15)*X(SRBM,T9) + (18.9649)*X(MRBM1,T6)
+ (18.5435)*X{MRBM1,T7) + (17.2652)*X(MRBM1,T8) + (17.8515)*X(MRBM1,T9)
+ (9.4824)*X(B1,T6) + (7.3376)*X{Bl,T7) + (8.205)*X(B1,T8)
+ (6.670S)*X{B1,T9) + (1.8182)*X{MRBM2,T6) + (1.7778)*X(MRBM2,T7) =G=
-267 ; (LHS = -345 ***)
CLASSDAM(AIRPORTS).. (13.87S7)*X(MRBM1,T10) + (1.8384)*X(MRBM1,T12)
84
+ (4.719)*X(B1,T10) + (O.8744)~X(B1,T11) + (l.8384)*X(B1,T12)
+ (3.7SS6)*X(F111,T10) + (8.20S)*X(F111,T11) + (7.S877)*X(F111,T12)
+ (9.6932)*X(MRBM2,T10) + (4.4625)*X(MRBM2,T11) + (3.7148)*X(MRBM2,T12)
=G= -182 ; (LHS = -270 ***)
REMAINING 2 ENTRIES SKIPPED
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---- MAXDEF =L= UPPER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
MAXDEF(SRBM) ..•. X(SRBM,TI) + X(SRBM,T2) +X(SRBM,T3) + X(SRBM",T4) + X(SRBM,T5)
+ X(SRBM,T6) + X(SRBM,T7) + X(SRBM,T8) + X(SRBM,T9) + X(SRBM,TIO)
+ X(SRBM,TIl) + X(SRBM,TIZ) + X(SRBM,T13) +X(SRBM,T14) + X(SRBM;T15)
+ X(SRBM,T16) + X(SRBM,T17) + X(SRBM,Tl8) + X(SRBM,T19)+ X(SRBM,T20)
=L= 1SO ; (LHS = 0)
MAXDEF(MRBM1) .. X(MRBM1,Tl) + X(MRBMl,T2) + X(MRBMl,T3) +X(MRBM1,T4)
+ X(MRBMl,T5) + X(MRBM1,T6) + X(MRBMl,T7) + X(MRBMl,T8) + X(MRBMl,T9)
+X(MRBMl,TlO) + X(MRBMl,Tll)+X(MRBM1,TI2) + X(MRBMl,T13)
+ X(MRBMl,T14} + X(MRBMl,T15) + X(MRBMl,T16) +X(MRBMl,T17)
+ X(MRBMl,T18) + X(MRBMl,T19) + X(MRBMl,T20) =L= 100 ;
(LHS = 0)
MAXDEF(Bl) .• X(Bl,Tl) + X(Bl,T2) + X(Bl,T3) + X(Bl,T4) + X(Bl,T5)+ X(Bl,T6)
+ X(Bl,T7) +X(Bl,T8) + X(Bl,T9) + X(Bl,TlO) + X(Bl,Tll)+ X(Bl,T12)
+ X(Bl,T13) + X(B1,114) +X(Bl,T15) + X(Bl,T16) + X(Bl,TI7) + X(Bl,T18)
+ X(Bl,T19) + X(Bl,T20) =L= 10 ; (LHS = 0)
REMAINING 2 ENTRIES SKIPPED
---- MINDEF =G= LOWER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
MINDEF(SRBM) •• X(SRBM,Tl) + X(SRBM,T2) + X(SRBM,T3) + X(SRBM,T4) + X(SRBM,T5)
+ X(SRBM,T6) + X(SRBM,T7) + X(SRBM,T8) + X(SRBM,T9) + X(SRBM,TIO)
+ X(SRBM,Tll) + X(SRBM,T12) + X(SRBM,T13) + X(SRBM,T14) + X(SRBM,T15)
+ X(SRBM,T16) + X(SRBM,T17) + X(SRBM,T18) + X(SRBM,T19) + X(SRBM,T20)
=G= 0 ; (LHS = 0)
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EQUATION LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
MINDEF =G= LOWER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
MINDEF(MRBMl) .. X(MRBMl,Tl) + X(MRBMl,T2) + X(MRBMl,T3) + X(MRBMl,T4)
+ X(MRBMl,TS) + X(MRBMl,T6) + X(MRBMl,T7) + X(MRBMl,T8) + X(MRBMl,T9)
+ X(MRBMl,TlO) + X(MRBMl,Tll) + X(MRBMl,T12) + X(MRBMl,T13)
+ X(MRBMI,T14) + X(MRBMl,TlS) + X(MRBMl,T16) + X{MRBMl,T17)
+ X(MRBMl,T18) + X(MRBMI ,T19) + X(MRBMI ,T20) =G= 0 ;
(LHS = 0)
MINDEF(Bl) .. X(Bl,TI) +X(Bl,T2) + X(Bl,T3) + X{Bl,T4) + X(BI,TS) +X(BI,T6)
+ X(Bl,T7) + X(Bl,T8) + X(Bl,T9) + X(Bl,TlO) + X(Bl,Tll) + X(Bl,T12)
+ X(Bl,T13) + X(Bl,T14) + X(Bl,TlS) + X(Bl,T16) + X(Bl,TI7) + X(Bl,T18)
+ X(Bl, T19) + X(Bl ,T20) =G= 4 ; (LHS = 0 ***)
REMAINING 2 ENTRIES SKIPPED
---- DAMAGEDEF =E= DAMAGE DEFINITION
DAMAGEDEF.. - (2.S647)*X(SRBM,T2) - (9.751l)*X(SRBM,T6) - (3.6876)*X(SRBM,T7)
- (4.8756)*X(SRBM,T8) - (S.S786)*X(SRBK,T9) - (5.l293)*X(SRBM,Tl8)
- (10~4612)*X(MRBMI,Tl) - (9.3l65)*X(MRBMl,T2) - (8.12S9)*X(MRBM1,T3)
- (13.076S)*X(MRBMl,T4) - (6.S008)*X(MRBMl,TS) - (12.6433)*X(MRBM1,T6)
- (7.3752)*X(MRBMl,T7) - (5.9535)*X(MRBMl,T8) - (5.5786)*X(MRBMl,T9)
- (22.6234)*X(MRBMl,TlO) - (O.909l)*X(MRBMl,T12) - (25.S667)*X(MRBMl,T14)
- (27.8524)*X(MRBMl,TlS) - (16.6183)*X(MRBMl,T16)
- (16.2519)*X(MRBMl,T17) - (IT.4353)*X(MRBMl,T18)
- (lG.2519)*X(MRBMl,T19) - (24.3778}*X(MRBMl,T20) - (2.4493)*X(Bl,Tl)
- (2.S647)*X(Bl,T2) - (2.04l1)*X(Bl,T3) - (3.061G)*X(Bl,T4)
- (1.6329)*X(Bl,T5) - (6.3216)*X(Bl,T6) - (2.9184)*X(Bl,T7)
- (2.8293)*X(Bl,T8) - (2.0845)*X(B1,T9) - (7.694)*X(Bl,TlO)
- (O.30l5)*X(Bl,Tll) - (0.9091)*X(B1,T12) - (l.2563)*X(B1,T13)
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EQUATION LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
DAMAGEDEF =E= DAMAGE DEFINITION
- (4.0405)*X(B1,T14) - (6.09l8)*X(Bl,T15) - (2.6264)*X(Bl,T16)
86
- (S.1293)*X(B1,T17) - (8.3382)*X(B1,T18) - (7.2S71)*X(B1,T19)
- (12.5072)*X(B1,T20) ~ (6.1233)*X(F111,T10) - (2.8293)*X{F111,T11)
- (3. 7522)*X{Flll, T12) - (11. 7888)*X{F1l1, T13) - (16 .6763)*X{F11l, T14)
- (4 ..040S)*X(F111,T15) - (9.4342)*X(F1l1,T16) - (5.0029)*X{MRBM2,T1)
- (3.0938)*X{MRBM2,T2) - (4.1691)*X{MRBM2,T3) - (3.847)*X{MRBM2,T4)
- (2.0517)*X{MRBM2,T5) - (1.2122)*X{MRBM2,T6) - (0.7071)*X{MRBM2,T7)
- (15.8041)*X(MRBM2,TIO) - (l.S388)*X(MRBM2,Tll) - (10837)*X(MRBM2,T12)
- (1107888)*X(MRBM2,T13) - (4.040S)*X(MRBM2,T14) - (2.0101)*X{MRBM2,T15)
- (1.3065)*X(MRBM2,T16) + DAM =E= 1755 ; (LHS = 1755)
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COLUMN LISTING SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261




















X{SRBM,T2) (.LO, .L, .UP = 0,
-200000 OBJECTIVE(0.0513) EXPDAM(T2)
1 MINFIRE (T2)(4.3599) CLASSDAM(SILOS)











( . LO , .L, . UP = - INF, 0, +INF)
DAMAGEDEF
COST COST TO BE MINIMIZED
COST ( •LO , •L, •UP = - INF, 0, +INF)
1 OBJECTIVE
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MODEL STATISTICS SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 7 SINGLE EQUATIONS 57
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 3 SINGLE VARIABLES 102
NON ZERO ELEMENTS 597 NON LINEAR N-Z 195
DERIVATIVE POOL 68 CONSTANT POOL 62
CODE LENGTH 3879
GENERATION TIME = 2.175 MINUTES
EXECUTION TIME = 2.458 MINUTES
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--- VERSION 5.0 APR 1984
_. - - - -
- - -- - -
courtesy of B. A. Murtagh and M. A. Saunders,
Department of Operations Research,
Stanford University{
Stanford Californ~a 94305 U.S.A.
9505 WORDS.
18880 WORDS.
WORK SPACE NEEDED (ESTIMATE)
WORK SPACE AVAILABLE
EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITERATIONS 7
NORM RG / NORM PI .OOOE+OO
TOTAL USED 5.58 UNITS
MINOS5 TIME 3.10 (INTERPRETER -
LOWER LEVEL
---- EQU OBJECTIVE






















T4 -0.150 -0.150 +INF 1.0000E+6
T5 -0.300 -0.300 +INF 1.0000E+6
T6 -0.200 -0.200 +INF 1.0000E+6
T7 -0.300 -0.300 +INF 1.0000E+6
T8 -0.310 -0.310 +INF 1.0000E+6
T9 -0.400 -0.400 +INF 1.0000E+6
T10 -0.050 -0.050 +INF 1. 0000E+6
TIl -0~310 -0.310 +INF 1.0000E+6
T12 -O~220 -0.220 +INF 1.0000E+6
T13 -0.100 -0.100 +INF 1~0000E+6
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SOLUTION <REPORT SOLVE VlAR USINGNLP FROM LINE 261
EQUEXPDAM RESTRICTION ON MINIMUM EXPECTED TARGET J DAMAGE
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
T14 -0.020 -0.020 +INF 1.0000E+6
T1S -0.020 -0.020 +INF 1.OOOOE+6
T16 -0.070 -0.070 +INF 1.0000E+6
Tl? -0~100 -0.100 +INF 1.0000E+6
T18 -0.100 -0.100 +INF 1.0000E+6
TI9 -0.100 -0.100 +INF LOOOOE+6.
T20 -0.,050 -0.050 +INF 1.0000E+6·
EQUMINFIRE MINIMUM NUMBER OF ALL WEAPONS USED ON: TARGET J
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL





.' 18.512 +INF·T6 6 ..000' 9.903 +INF
T7 11.427 +INF
T8 7.206 +INF
T9 . 4.106 +INF




T14 15.000 46.873 +INF
TIS 15.000 28.065 +INF
T16 10.000 24.066 +INF
T17 14.168 +INF
T18 44.891 +INF
T19 . 14.168 +INF
T20 8.000 22.722 +INF
EQU CLASSDAM LOWER BOUND OF EXPECTED DAMAGE ON TARGET CLASS K
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
SILOS -352.000 -99.350 +INF
SHIPYRDS -267.000 -103.370 +INF
AIRPORTS -182.000 -51.590 +INF
SPARES -177.000 -11. 700 +INF
pm'lPLANT -339.000 -35.390 +INF
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SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
89
EQU MAXDEF UPPER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS J
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
SRBM -INF 104.560 150.000 .
MRBMl -INF 100.000 100.000 -7.389E+7
B1 -INF 8.808 10.000 .
Flll -INF 85.000 85.000 -L631E+7 .,
MRBM2 -INF 105.000 105.000 -2.291E+7
---- EQU MINDEF, LOWER BOUND OF # OF WEAPON I USED ON TARGETS,J
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
SRBM 1040,560 +INF
MRBM1
.' 100.000 +INFB1 4.000 8.808 +INF
Fll1 85.000 +INF
MRBM2 105.000 +INF
LOWER LEVEL UPPER MARGINAL
---- EQU DAMAGEDEF 1755.000 1755.000 1755.000 EPS
DAMAGEDEF DAMAGE DEFINITION
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SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261






















MRBM1.T1S 28.065 +INF 7.4183E+7
MRBM1.T16 16.517 +INF 7.4176E+7




MRBMLT19 14.168 +INF 7.4169E+7
MRBMLT20' 13.914 +INF 7. 4177E+7
B1 .Tl +INF 3.8053E+7
Bl .T2 +INF 3.8049E+7
Bl .T3 +INF 3.8051E+7
B1 .T4 +INF 3.8055E+7
B1 .T5 +INF 3.8049E+7
B1 .T6 +INF 3.8040E+7
B1 .T7 +INF 3.8036E+7
B1 .T8 +INF 3.8032E+7
Bl .T9 +INF 3.8028E+7
B1 .T10 +INF 3.8059E+7
B1 .Tll +INF 3.8058E+7
B1 .T12 +INF 3.8057E+7
B1 .T13 +INF 3.8060E+7
B1 .T14 +INF 3.8061E+7
B1 .TIS +INF 3.8061E+7
B1 .T16 +INF 3.8060E+7
Bl .T17 +INF 3.80S6E+7




Bl .T20 8.808 +INF 3.8057E+7
Flll .Tl +INF 4.2llSE+7
Flll .T2 +INF 4.2ll5E+7
Flll .T3 +INF 4.2115E+7
Flll .T4 +INF 4.211SE+7
flU .TS +INF 4.2USE+7
Flll . T6 +INF 4.2llSE+7
Flll .T7 +INF 4.2115E+7
flU •T8 +INF 4.2ll5E+7




Flll .Tll 12.418 +INF 4.2086E+7




Flll .T14 46.873 +INF 4.2ll3E+7
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SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE WAR USING NLP FROM LINE 261
VAR X THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS I TO BE ASSIGNED TO TARGET J




Flll .T16 7.550 +INF 4.2110E+7
Flll .T17 +INF 4.2115E+7
F1ll .T18 +INF 4.2115E+7
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E X E CUT I N G
281 =====================================================
282 FIN A L REP 0 R T
283 =====================================================
286 PARAMETER REPORT SUGGESTED USAGE OF WEAPON I ON TARGET J


























B1 4 10 9
Flll 85 85
MRBM2 105 105
288 PARAMETER REPORT3 = 2632361023 TOTAL JUN EXPECTED COST.
289 VARIABLE DAM.L = 1559 DAMAGE VALUE
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**** FILE SUMMARY
INPUT C: GAMS2.02A WAR.GMS
OUTPUT c: GAMS2.02AWAR.LST




THE PROGRAWWASWRITTENINVS FORTRAN, DEBUGGED AND EXECUTED ON
THE IBM 3033 MAINFRAME, AT NPS, BY LCDR HARRY ATHANASOPOULOS, 1987.








. X~COORDINATES OF TARGET
Y- _"- _"-
NUMBER OF SONOBUOYS
TOTAL NUMBER OF TARGETS
TOTAL NUMBER OF DETECTED TARGETS
STAND.DEVIATION OF THE TARGETS DISTRIBUTION
INTEGER SEED FOR THE LNORM N(O,l) GENERATOR
BIVARIATE N(O,2S) TARGET X;"COORDINATE
-"- -"- -"- Y-COORDINATE
















C THIS PROGRAM SIMULATES THE DETECTION OF A TARGET, WHEN THE TARGET
C APPEARS RAND0l1LY INSIDE A GIVEN PATTERN OF 16 SONOBUOYS .. THE PATTERN
C OF THE. POSITIONS OF THE SONOBUOYS IS GIVEN BY THE COORDINATES OF
C THEIR CENTERS .. DETECTION OCCURS WHEN THE TARGET APPEARS EITHER
C WITHIN 2 NMFROMTHE SONOBUOY OR AT A DISTANCE BETWEEN 30 AND 33
C NAUTICAL MILES (NM) FROM IT, 360 DEGREES AROUND IT. IN THE CASE
C OF OVERLAPPING SONOBUOY LETHAL AREAS, THE TARGET IS ACCOUNTED AS
C BEING 'HIT' ONLY ONCE.
C THE RANDOM TARGETS HAVE BIVARIATE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION WITH:MEAN
C ZERO, STANDARD DEVIATION 25 NM AND ARE INDEPENDENT FROM ONE ANOTHER.
C A TARGET'S RANDOM COORDINATES ARE GENERATED USING THE 'LNORM'
C ROUTINE FOR STANDARD NORMAL RANDOM VARIABLES.
C THE SIMULATION IS RUN 1000 TIMES AND THE ACHIEVED PROBe OF DETECTION
C (PD) IS PROBABLY THE BEST FOR THIS KIND OF SONOBUOY PATTERN.
C
C THE ANALYTICAL ESTIMATIONS OF PROBABILITY OF DETECTION. ARE COMPUTED




























DIMENSION RN(2),X(16),Y(16)C----------------------------------------------------- ----------------C SONOBUOY COORDINATES FOR THE GIVEN PATTERN
c---------------------------------------------------------------------DATA X/5. ,10. ,30.,-15. ,-30. ,0.,0. ,0. ,0. ,-10. ,10. ,-10. ,10. ,-10.,
*10. ,0./
DATA Y/O./O. ,0. ,0. ,0. ,10. ,15. ,20. ,-5. ,5. ,5. ,-20. ,-20. ,-10.,









c----------------------------------------------------------------------C PROVIDE ANY INTEGER "SEED" FOR THE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
c--------------------------------------·--------------------------------ISEED =87937
C---------------------------------------------------------------------C BEGIN SIMULATIONC---------------------------------------------------------------------20 DO-1 I=1,TRIALS
10 CALL LNORM(ISEED,RN,2,1,0)
UX=SIGMA*RN(1)
UY=SIGMA*RN(2)C----------------------------------------------------------------------C TARGET APPEARANCE FREQUENCY CHECK INSIDE THE TARGET AREAC----------------------------------------------------------------------RRR=SQRT(UX**2+UY**2)
IF1RRR.LE.25.) C1=C1+1IF RRR.GT.25 ••AND.RRR.LE.50.) C2=C2+1












70 FORMAT ( I S I M U L A T ION RES U L T SI)
WRITE(9,80)
80 FORMAT(' =======================================1,/)WRITE(9,85)
85 FORMAT ( , FOR THE GIVEN PATTERN,' ,I j)
WRITE(9,90) TRIALS,BINGO
90 FORMAT(' NUMBER OF RANDOM TARGETS =' ,F8.0,', DETECTED =' ,F8.0)
WRITE~9'100) PD100 FORMAT I PROBe OF DETECTION WITH EXISTING PATTERN =' ,F7.3,1111)
WRITE 9,109)
109 FORMAT 1 A N A L Y TIC RES U L T S')
WRITE 9,110)





C***** END OF MAIN PROGRAM *****
C
C
C---------------------------------------------------------------------C THIS SUBROUTINE COMPUTES ANALYTIC RESULTS
C---------------------------------------------------------------------.
SUBROUTINE CONFET(SIGMA,SONOS)








C-----------------------------~----------------------- ----------------C ANALYTIC APPROXIMATION OF DETECTION PROBABILITY WITH UTTER OPTIMISM
c---------------------------------------------------------------------PDOPT = l-EXP(-Z)
WRITE(9,120) PDOPT
120 FORMAT{' PROB. OF DETECTION WITH UTTER OPTIMISM = I,F6.4,//)C---------------------------------------------------------------------C DETECTION PROBABILITY USING IICONFETTI APPROXIMATION #1 11C---------------------------------------------------------------------PDCON1 = (1-EXP(-SQRT(Z»)**2
WRITE(9,121) PDCON1
121 FORMAT ( I PROB." OF DETECTION FROM CONFETTI APPROX. #1 = I ,F6.4,f /)
C---------------------------------------------------------------------C DETECTION PROBABILITY USING IICONFETTI APPROXIMATION #2 11
C---------------------------------------------------------------------PDCON2 = 1-(1+SQRT(2*Z»*EXP(-SQRT(2*Z»)
WRITE(9,122) PDCON2





RES U L T S




A N A L Y TIC
---------------------------------
---------------------------------
S I M U L A T ION
=======================================
C












C FOR THE GIVEN PATTERN,
C
C
C NUMBER OF RANDOM TARGETS = 1000., DETECTED =









C PROB. OF DETECTION WITH UTTER OPTIMISM
C
C
C PROB. OF DETECTION FROM CONFETTI APPROX. #1 =0.6278
C
C

















C THIS PROGRAM HELPS IN EVALUATING SIX AIRCRAFT GUN SYSTEMS, USING
C AIR-TO-AIR SIMULATED COMBAT DATA, PROVIDED BY THE NAVY;- IT GIVES (PK).
C' (PA) IS ASSUMED TO BE GREATER OR EQUAL TO .70~
C DATA FROM THE SIMULATION ARE IN A DATA DASE FILE CALLED "IN"
C
C THE PROGRAM WAS WRITTEN IN VS FORTRAN, DEBUGGED AND EXECUTED ON
C THE IBM 3033 MAINFRAME, AT NPS, BY LCDR HARRYATHANASOPOULOS, 1987.






C A AIRCRAFT AREA, AT MOMENT OF ENGAGEMENT
C AV . VULNERABLE AIRCRAFT AREA DURING: ENGAGEMENT
C PA .' PROB. OF OBTAINING FIRING POSITION, DURING ENGAGEMENT
C PH . PROB. OF HITTING ENEMY AIRCRAFT, PER·ROUND
C N . NUMBER OF ROUNDS, FIRED, PER ENGAGEMENT
CNN GUN SYSTEM COUNTER, ACCORDING TO INPUT SEQUENCE
CPKH PROB. OF RILL, GIVEN A HIT, PER ROUND
C'PKR PROB. OF KILL, PER ROUND
C PK . PROB. OF KILL, PROVIDED (N) ROUNDS WERE FIRED







OPEN(UNIT =8,FILE = lIN')
OPEN(UNIT = 9,FILE = 'OUT I )C---------------------------------------------------------------------C READ SIMULATION DATA FROM INPUT FILE
c~---------------------------------------------------- ----------------NN=l
10READ(8,*) A,AV,PA,PH,NC---------------------------------------------------------------------C CHECK FOR THE END OF INPUT FILEC---------------------------------------------------------------------IF(A .LT. 0.) GOTO 1C---------------------------------------------------------------------C INPUT ERROR TRAPPINGC---------------------------------------------------------------------IF«PA .GT. 1.) .OR. (PA .LT. O.)} GOTO 333
IF«PH .GT. 1.) .OR. (PH .LT. 0.» GOTO 334
c---------------------------------------------------------------------C THESE ARE THE MATHEMATICAL EQUATIONS THAT WE NEEDC---------------------------------------------------------------------.
PKH = AV/A
PKR = PRH*PH
PK = (1 - (1 - PKR) ** N) * PAC---------------------------------------------------------------------C CREATE THE OUTPUT FILEC---------------------------------------------------------------------WRITE~9,100) NN
100 F~iIT!fi ;:~ : I ==~=~=;=;;=~=~=;===;~~=~~=;!;~~!!=~~~~:f;~2======= I
.97
WRITE 9 *~ I IWRITE 9;* I INPUT VALUES (FOR THIS GUN SYSTEM)', 1 ,
WRI.TE 9,108) A
108 FORMAT I A = ',F6.3)
WRITE 9,107) AV
107 FORMAT I AV=' ,F6.3)
WRITE 9,106) PA
106 FORMAT ( I PA=', F6 .3)
WRITE{9,105) PH
105 FORMAT (I PH=', F6. 3)
WRITE(9,104) N
104', FORMAT(' N = ',I6)
WRITE (9~ *) 1_ - ------------,
WRITE(9,101) PK
101 FORMATe' PROBABILITY OF RILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS ',F6.3)
WRITE(9,*) 1--------------1IF(PK .LT••65) WRITE(9,*) I NOTE: PK <.650'
C--------------------------------------------------------~------------C HOW MANY ROUNDS ARE NECESSARY FOR (PK) GREATER THAN .650?
C---------------------------------------------------------------------FIRE =0
222 FIRE = FIRE + 1
PK = (1 - (1 - PKR) **FIRE )*PA





102 F~.:~il(~i* l' *!~~*;~~*~t2**~*I;*~**~~J!S!~;*~!*!I~~*~~~~~~~~!~~*L2*,
WRITE 9,* ( ,
WRITE 9, * ( (




I N P U-T F I L E
--------------------
--------------------
12.5, 2.0, .7 .3 , 26
18.5, 5.0, .8 .5 , 20
10.0, 3.0, .7 , .4 30
08.0, 1.0, .8 .6 10
15.3, 8.0, .8 .7 18
98
- THIS FILE CONTAINS SIMULATION AVERAGE DATA OF SIX AIRCRAFT GUN
SYSTEMS.




















C INPUT ERROR MESSAGES
c----------------------------------------------------------------------333 WRITE(9,*) I GIVEN· "PAil NOTA PROPABILITY, WRONG DATA'
334 WRITE(9,*) 1 GIVEN "PH" NOT A PROBABILITY, WRONG DATAl
STOP
1 WRITE(9,*) ,*****************************************************I











54 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
NOTE: PK <.650
FOR PK >.650,
RES U L T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 3
PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.505
RES UL T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO.2
*****************************************************
PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.685
20.0, 4.0, .9 I .8, 12
-1.0, 0.0, 0.0 I Q~O~~~ 0
================================
A , AV I PA , PH , N
================================
OUT PUT F I L E
RES UL T S FOR GUN SYSTEM NO.1













--------------PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.756
--------------FOR PK >.650, 12 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
*****************************************************
















































































PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS 0.789




ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 5
FOR GUN SYSTEM NO. 6




RES U L T S
RESULTS
RES U L T S
FOR PK >.650,













--------------PROBABILITY OF KILL (PK) WITH ABOVE N IS
--------------FOR PK >.650, 4 ROUNDS OF FIRE ARE NEEDED
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